


SUPP.

DUMFRIES AND GALLOWAY CONSTABULARY

LOCKERBIE AIR DISASTER
WEDNESDAY 21 DECEMBER 1988



ASSESSMENT OF DEBRIEF REPORTS

LOCKERBIE INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRE
DRYFE ROAD
LOCKERBIE.

CONFIDENTIAL

LOCKERBIE AIR DISASTER


WEDNESDAY 21 DECEMBER 1988

A
Collation
of
De-Brief
Reports
Submitted

CONFIDENTIAL

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I should like to record my appreciation to the representatives of the Police Forces, Military Services, Volunteer Associations, Government Agencies, Regional Council and Civilian Organisations who were involved in this terrible disaster and who took the time to provide me with their views, without which this Report would not have been possible.


*Chief Superintendent
Strathclyde Police*

"By three methods we may learn wisdom -

*first, by reflection, which is the noblest;
second, by imitation, which is the easiest;
and the
third by experience, which is the bitterest."*

Confucious.

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LOCKERBIE AIR DISASTER - OPERATIONAL MATTERS

1. INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 *This report has been prepared in an attempt to collate the many and varied duties which fell on the shoulders of police personnel involved operationally in this Disaster.*
- 1.2 *It encompasses de-brief reports from a variety of agencies both within and outwith police circles and the objective of this dissemination is to place on record many of the lessons learned.*
- 1.3 *The points mentioned should not be regarded as an exhaustive list nor should this report be regarded as a "training" package. The sheer magnitude of this catastrophe does not readily lend itself to that particular scenario and in reality, this report should therefore be regarded as informative.*
- 1.4 *It is not the intention of this document to go over that which has already been presented by way of initial reports, slides and videos, the assumption being that potential recipients have already been apprised of the generalities of the Disaster.*
- 1.5 *Nor is it the intention of this document to detail those standard procedures contained in Orders and Memoranda issued by Police Forces for the guidance of their personnel, the assumption being that such information is already known.*
- 1.6 *For the purposes of this exercise, the various comments have been reported under appropriate headings set in order as far as possible to keep abreast of the operation as it developed.*

2. RENDEZVOUS POINT

1. In any Major Incident, it is obviously vitally important that a Rendezvous Point (RV) Forward Control Point, or Temporary Incident Post be established immediately and it is true to say that the establishment of such a place, whatever it is called is mentioned in most Major Incident or Disaster plans.
2. In any type of Major Incident the R.V. Point must be clearly defined and easily found, particularly where large numbers of personnel can be expected to attend be they Police or Non Police personnel.
3. Depending on the type of Incident, the R.V. Point could be sited at the perimeter of any outer or inner cordons and in direct contact with the Control Centre or Police Main Base Station. It should not be part of the Control Centre.
4. Ideally, the R.V. Point should be in an area with an abundance of vehicle parking facilities and with a large hall close by wherein personnel can be held pending further instructions.
5. The Officer in Charge of the R.V. Point should be of rank commensurate with the size of the Incident. He should have, as part of his team:-
 - 5.1 Personnel to adopt the role of support administration for his area of command and communication between him and the Control Centre;
 - 5.2 Personnel to control the arrival, parking and dispatch of vehicles, be they police vehicles or vehicles used by the other services and agencies attending the Incident (See Transport), and,
 - 5.3 Personnel to link with those being held in any Holding Area.
6. It should be appreciated that in an Incident on the scale of the Lockerbie Disaster, all Emergency Services will be heavily involved in the initial stages, Mutual Aid will arrive from various Police Forces, Fire Brigades, and Ambulance Areas, volunteers, either as individuals or as members of an organisation will arrive in large numbers and all of them will be seeking an identified Point at which to report and be instructed. It is imperative therefore, that this matter be addressed by the Incident Commander at a very early stage.

7. *It is not uncommon for Senior Officers attending the first report of a Major Incident, to identify the nearest Police Office as the centre of control for the Incident and this is invariably good practice. However, whenever it becomes clear that the Incident is likely to attract an input of a variety of resources, the situation as regards the establishment of an R.V. Point for long-term use is one requiring a pressing decision.*

8. *Control of the R.V. Point obviously rests with the designated Officer in Charge who is regarded as part of the Operations Team albeit he is physically detached. On behalf of the Incident Commander, it is good practice for him to regard himself an "off-site" point to centralise the various aspects of resource and vehicular movements.*

9. *Although the deployment of resources is directed by Operations, such directions will be implemented by "hands-on" supervisors at the R.V. Point, Holding Area and Transport Area. Obviously, a deployment of personnel will require transportation and only by communication will this be achieved in a structured manner. Therefore, consideration may be given to appointing an officer as an R.V. Point Marshall who would pull together these various functions. One of his more important functions would be to ensure that transport for departing personnel is properly utilised and that all personnel detailed for departure are accounted for even although this should be established by resource supervisors themselves and the Personnel Control Officer.*

10. *It is natural and perfectly understandable that resources arriving at the R.V. Point will want to move forward and put to use their various skills. If all resources move forward, then the structured approach becomes difficult to achieve. The Officer in Charge R.V. Point must therefore direct that only dedicated supervisors move forward for further instruction and that their contingents remain in the Holding Area.*

11. *The importance of an established accessible and identifiable R.V. Point can not be over-stressed for it is the first location that resources attending will arrive. If they find an element of Command & Control there, then their subsequent input to the Incident will endeavour to match the apparent professionalism of Police Control.*

3.

INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRE

1.

Many Major Incidents occur whereby the scale or complexity demand the presence of a dedicated Control Centre rather than a Command Vehicle, or other temporary Incident Post.

2.

The type and scale of the Incident together with the geography of the area as well as availability of premises, will dictate the location and size of the property sought. Obviously common sense will prevail but it is good practice to "think big."

3.

Naturally, the first inclination of any Incident Commander setting up a "permanent" Control Centre is to allocate accommodation to Police resources only. On most occasions, this procedure would be perfectly correct. However, there is merit in allocating accommodation to other agencies, including non-service resources.

3.1

The Incident could well be one of Disaster proportions and of International implications and cognisance must be taken of other agency involvement including the recognised emergency services. In the Lockerbie Incident, practically every resource input had a "base" within the Control Centre including, for example:-

3.1.1

The American Consulate
Pan American Airways
Regional Council
RAYNET (Radio Amateurs Emergency Network)
S.A.R.D.A. (Search & Rescue Dog Association)
Red Cross
Salvation Army, and
Mountain Rescue Organisation

as well as

3.1.2

The Army
The Royal Air Force
Fire Brigade
Ambulance Service

and also other various agencies viz:-

3.1.3

Regional Planning Department
Social Work Department
British Telecom
Health Board

3.2

The normal Police "Departments" and officers associated with an Incident Centre were also allocated but these included other investigative agencies such as:

3.2.1 *The Procurator Fiscal
Air Accidents Investigation Branch
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Bundeskriminalamt (West Germany), and the
Federal Aviation Administration*

- 3.3 *The result of having the foregoing resources (and others) represented under the one roof was the perception of a commonality of purpose, ease of contact and excellent communications as well as everyone being endowed with a sense of all being part of the same "team."*
4. *Matters affecting the running of Incident Centres or Police Main Base Stations etc., have been well documented elsewhere but it may be of benefit to make mention of some points either to stress their importance or to invite consideration of their inclusion in Major Incident Planning.*
5. *Security of the building is of the utmost importance and this must be established at an early stage (i.e. Inner Cordon). Such security should extend to dedicated door control to one entry/exit only and it may be that security is also required inside the Centre (e.g. the Chief Constable's Office).*
- 5.1 *If the Incident is likely to be one of long term proportions, consideration should be given to have these duties performed by the same personnel. By so doing, the Officers involved very quickly develop a routine and a knowledge of authorised persons and thus they are able to spot any "strangers" easily.*
6. *As the Incident settles, then sign-posting usually takes place outside directing personnel to the Centre, the R.V. Point or wherever. Depending on the size of the building, it is good practice to perform a similar exercise inside the Centre.*
- 6.1 *Consideration should be given to identifying each room by name, having a system of directional signs similar to that used in hospitals and also internal building plans with the rooms identified thereon. One such point should always be at the entry foyer.*
7. *Obviously, at the start of any Major Incident, a log of events is started and this must be maintained until the Incident closes. It is possible that a number of "logs" must be started apart from the events log. It may be that a Personnel Control Log and/or a Traffic Log will be in use and while all logs serve a valuable purpose at the start, it is imperative that the log eventually centred on the Operations Room, is regarded as the Base document.*

- 7.1 In other words all items logged should eventually be entered in the Operations Room Log and that log regarded as the authoritative document. The paper flow relative to maintaining such a log and actioning matters arising is easily achieved by use of a self-carbonated receiving form in triplicate which allows the dispatch of copies as appropriate.
- 7.2 It is also good practice to have the log content typed, copied and circulated to the various Heads of Department.
8. Elsewhere in this report, mention is made of the control of vehicles. However, it should be borne in mind that some vehicles must be regarded as dedicated and to that end, require to be parked at the Control Centre. It is important that this matter is addressed firmly in order that only essential vehicles are permitted to proceed to the Centre (e.g. vehicles used by Chief Constable, Deputy Chief Constable, Procurator Fiscal, etc).
9. Office equipment is obviously very important and it is good practice to have a small store within the Centre for the supply of basic materials. Control of this area is also important and although overall control is exercised by the Quartermaster, if he is positioned outwith the Centre, then his interests could be represented by the Office Manager.
10. Apart from the necessity of basic office and administrative materials, advantage should be taken of available technology and applied as appropriate to officers requiring same.
- 10.1 As an example, consideration should be given to the Operations Room being supplied with a word processor, a facsimile machine and a photocopier. It may be that a telex machine should be included although the use of a Fax machine is inclined to diminish such a requirement.
- 10.2 The presence of "Nobo" boards and flip charts is essential as is an abundance of wall space for affixing of relevant material.
- 10.3 If possible a position should be found for a Radio Operator within the Operations Room to enable instant communication with outside resources.
11. In every Major Incident, the establishment of various offices and departments is necessary to ensure a dedicated and professional approach to resolution and each such establishment has a very important role to perform.

- 11.1 *These areas will evolve in line with the type of Incident and the perceived duration and will be tailored accordingly. However it is a fact that most types of Major Incidents will have an Operations Room and it is therefore important that much attention is paid to that particular Office.*
- 11.2 *As stated, much will depend on the type of Incident but as a matter of course, the Incident Commander should have as part of his team, either in situ or stationed appropriately:-*
- 11.2.1 *An Officer of at least Inspector rank as Staff Officer or Office Manager who has a special responsibility as regards administration, control of junior personnel and all matters affecting the smooth running of the Operations Room;*
 - 11.2.2 *A Traffic Management Officer of sufficient rank to action all matters affecting transport;*
 - 11.2.3 *A Personnel Control Officer (See Paper 4);*
 - 11.2.4 *Officers of sufficient rank to control and organise matters relative to Casualties, Victims and Property;*
 - 11.2.5 *Police Officers representing their home Forces supplied under Mutual Aid for reasons of liaison;*
 - 11.2.6 *Representatives of the Emergency Services;*
 - 11.2.7 *Representatives of organisations heavily committed to the Incident (e.g. - Air Accidents Investigation Branch), and;*
 - 11.2.8 *A representative of any Military input;*
- 11.3 *As indicated some of the foregoing may not be physically stationed in the Operations Room but nonetheless should be regarded as part of the control structure servicing the Incident.*
12. *It is good practice to have at least one Officer of rank with good local knowledge, as a member of the Operations Team.*
13. *There should also be present a number of Constables for duties as "runners." Their presence will prove invaluable particularly in the early stages.*
14. *It is important to bear in mind that the Operations Room will be regarded by many as the central control point of the Incident and as such, personnel operating therein must be prepared to react to a variety of requests in a highly professional and dedicated manner.*

- 14.1 In this regard, it is good practice for the Incident Commander to "hand pick" his team.
15. Obviously welfare of personnel must be considered and it is vitally important and indeed essential, that personnel are afforded adequate rest periods (i.e. days off, hours on/off duty etc).
- 15.1 To this end, it is fairly common procedure to have personnel replaced on a regular basis. However, when this principle is directed at key personnel, such as Operations Room staff, there is merit in identifying dedicated "ghosts" in an attempt to maintain continuity.
- 15.2 For example if the Personnel Control Officer was off for a day he would always be replaced by the same Officer. In other words, any one key position would be serviced by the same two or three officers only on a rotational basis.
- 15.3 In practice, the early stages of a Major Incident preclude days off and if the Incident is actively running throughout the 24 hour period, then the foregoing can be achieved by the dedicated Officers working 12 hours on and 12 hours off.
- 15.4 However, there is merit in having if possible, Incident Command dedicated to the Incident Commander and his Deputy only thus ensuring continuity of purpose. This proposal works if the Incident is one whereby outside influences dictate activity levels (e.g. where the hours of available daylight confine resource activity).
- 15.5 In any event it is an absolute must that any rotation of key personnel comprises the same officers.

4.

PERSONNEL CONTROL

4.1

When an Incident is of such dimensions that it can not be serviced 'in-house' then personnel will be drawn from the host Force or from surrounding Forces under Mutual Aid arrangements.

4.2

It is good practice to identify at an early stage an officer designated as Personnel Control Officer (P.C.O.) as a member of the Incident Management Team.

4.2.1

Depending upon the scale of the Incident, this Officer should be at least of Inspector rank, but preferably Chief Inspector rank.

4.2.2

He should be stationed in the Operations Centre in the first instance but failing that, at the rendezvous point with direct, dedicated communication to the Operations Centre.

4.2.3

The P.C.O. should be supported in his role by at least one Constable and a typist and should have available to him the use of a Fax machine quite apart from a dedicated telephone.

4.2.4

The availability of a micro-computer and printer would also be of benefit at an early stage in order that a hard-copy record of all resources is maintained for the duration of the incident.

4.2.5

Access to a photo-copier would allow the P.C.O. to supply Unit Supervisors with a hard-copy detailing their resources and place of duty.

4.2.6

It may be that a suitable format can be devised for inclusion of such information in H.O.L.M.E.S. thus allowing a terminal to be sited at the P.C.O.'s place of operation.

4.3

It is imperative that Officers in Charge of details attending at the Incident provide the P.C.O. with full details of the resources attending. These details should include full name, shoulder plate number, Force, Division and station of origin of all personnel under his control. Such objectives can be achieved by the supervisor concerned recording such details while travelling with his contingent to the scene (i.e. on the 'bus or personnel carrier).

4.3.1

There is no value in having ALL resources reporting to the P.C.O. and it is good practice for the supervisor in charge to leave his personnel at the marshalling/deployment centre while he alone reports to the P.C.O.

- 4.3.2 *Conversely, it is also imperative that Officers in Charge of details report to the P.C.O. prior to departure from the incident.*
- 4.4 *As the incident develops and stabilises, the P.C.O. will be in a position to identify the resource requirements and a brief resume of duties for each specific area of the incident. He would thus be able to supply the Officer in Charge of details with such information thereby allowing him to brief his contingents in a more professional manner.*
- 4.5 *The P.C.O. requires to take cognisance of aspects of personnel control other than recording and allocating. He should ensure that:-*
- 4.5.1. *Adequate arrangements are made for the provision of refreshment and meals;*
- 4.5.2 *Personnel are timeously relieved, having regard to the nature and length of time of duties being performed;*
- 4.5.3 *All resources are deployed to maximum efficiency and effectiveness;*
- 4.5.4 *A suitable area is selected for use by personnel held in reserve.*
- 4.5.5 *Personnel not employed on specific tasks are retained in the reserve area and not left to wander about.*
- 4.5.6 *At all times, he knows the whereabouts of any specific officer so that any personal matters, court citations etc., can be rapidly actioned.*
- 4.6 *In an incident involving other agencies and services, the P.C.O. should take steps to identify the person in charge of these units. Having done so, he should actively encourage them to follow closely the same procedures as he does in relation to the control of Police resources. In fact, the availability and allocation of all manpower resources should be centralised through the P.C.O.*
- 4.6.1 *The P.C.O. should identify himself to the Police Liaison Officer to ensure a two-way flow of information regarding non-police agencies input thus reducing any conflict of resourcing.*
- 4.7 *He should also be aware that many Police supervisors and agency representatives will use him as a de-briefing medium when they report to him prior to their departure. He must take account of this and either ensure that he has time to perform this role or have in his mind, an officer to whom he can direct them. It may be that the Office Manager in Operations is the person to assume that function.*

5.

TRANSPORT

1. For the purposes of this report, the heading "Transport" is taken as encompassing all matters relevant to transportation, movement and control of vehicles, diversions, etc.
2. Invariably, the first Police response to a Major Incident will be a mobile resource and this will probably provide the first line of communication. Second only to communication is the need for structured and professional traffic management.
3. The many tasks to be performed under the auspices of Traffic Management in the initial stages of an Incident are well documented in various Major Incident Plans and there is no need to list these in this paper.
4. There is however, merit in mentioning briefly the more important points relative to these tasks such as:-
 - 4.1 identifying and keeping access roads to and from the scene open;
 - 4.2 identifying diversionary routes;
 - 4.3 manning of static points on the primary and diversionary;
 - 4.4 advising motorists via the media of the traffic arrangements and;
 - 4.5 arranging the appropriate road signs to be placed either by the motoring organisations or local authority;
5. One other action the senior 'traffic' officer on site initially should take is; having established the identity and location of any vehicle designated as a temporary command post, instruct all drivers of all emergency vehicles arriving at the scene to switch off their emergency 'blue' lights. By doing so, only one emergency light will be in use and thus the whereabouts of the Command Post and Incident Commander, can be readily identified.
6. As the Incident develops, so too will the role of the Traffic/Transport Control Officer and he, or his representative, must have a physical presence in the Operations Room.

7. To him will be passed all matters relative to traffic management be it requests for No Waiting Signs, extra vehicles, specialised vehicles, etc., etc.,
8. He should, on behalf of the Incident Commander, take action as regards the parking of police vehicles arriving at the Rendezvous Point where, ideally, adequate parking facilities will be available. His department should be physically represented at this point to ensure structured "hands-on" action.
9. Liaison should be developed between the Traffic Control Officer and his counterparts in other emergency services. Depending on the scale and type of Incident, he may also have to establish similar links with Military personnel as well as other agencies and volunteer organisations attending and it is good practice for him to be identified as the focal point for all traffic-type aspects for all resources attending.
10. The Traffic Control Officer should be aware of all types of vehicles available on-site from any source in order that efficient use can be made of them. He should be aware that any Army input will arrive with a variety of vehicles, including personnel transport.
11. It may be that circumstances dictate that further parking areas are identified for vehicles other than those used by the Police.
12. A system should be developed whereby vehicles arriving at the Traffic Control/Rendezvous Point are logged and the keys retained in a "pool". It is good practice to firmly pursue the return of vehicle keys to the "pool" each time the vehicle is used.
13. Where traffic is routed on a road in sight of the Incident area, that particular part of the road will require extra Police attention to keep the traffic moving, as it is likely that sightseers driving there will cause accidents as a result of looking at the Incident site instead of the road.
14. At the Traffic Control/Rendezvous Point, it is good practice for the designated Officer to interest himself in the arrival and departure of all Police personnel to ensure that these matters are conducted in a structured fashion.

6. COMMUNICATIONS

1. At the very core of any Major Incident lies "communications."
2. These "communications" are vital to allow control of the Incident and response to the multiplicity of requests and demands attendant at any Major Incident.
3. Communications can mean, amongst other things,
 - telephones (dedicated, mobile or secure)
 - radios (vehicular & personal)
 - Fax (normal or secure)
 - Telex (normal or secure)
 - Computer lines (H.O.L.M.E.S. C.R.I.S.I.S.)
 - Internal Public Address System.

Communications can also mean the use of inter-personal skills to establish and maintain the necessary rapport with other agency representations. The essential two-way flow of information between control management personnel and on-site supervisors is equally important and can not be over-stressed.

4. Depending upon the scale of the Incident and the location of the site, communications available could range from being intact to none. For example, a Major Incident affecting a small town surrounded by radio hostile terrain could easily lose all lines of communication, as at Lockerbie.
 - 4.1 Force-wide VHF radios (vehicles) may well remain available but UHF radios (personal) will be of little or no use. The loss of telephones will serve to exacerbate the situation.
 - 4.2 Laying aside the forthcoming changes in radio systems (WARC) which may well overcome some of these problems, several points are worthy of note which may provide the Incident Commander with several options.

5. TELEPHONE RESOURCES

- 5.1 British Telecom (B.T.) will respond rapidly and make every effort to restore telephone lines. They will also provide telephone lines to the Control Centre and other premises used in the Incident. It may be that the area concerned has only a limited number of subscriber lines and B.T. will, if required, divert lines from public subscribers to the Incident.

- 5.2 Although this action will allow Incident telephone communication, it will deprive the private subscriber the use of their telephone. One effect of this is that relatives and friends of the residents in the Incident Area will be unable to contact their loved ones to ensure their well-being. These enquirers will then telephone the nearest Police Office to further their enquiries resulting in increased traffic to already over-loaded locations.
- 5.3 In the longer term, a mobile telephone exchange can be transported to the Incident area.
- 5.4 B.T. will also respond to requests for various other services, e.g. telex, fax, etc., and will also action any requirement for secure lines which will be required by the Chief Constable, Special Branch and possibly other units involved in the Incident.
- 5.5 Turning now to the more basic aspects of telephone communications, it is good practice to have flashing lights on individual telephones placed in very busy offices, i.e. Operations Room. Such an input allows personnel to rapidly identify which telephone is ringing.
- 5.6 An internal telephone directory is essential and this should be continually up-dated and circulated to all offices within the Control Centre and any other buildings being used in the Incident.
- 5.7 B.T. will also supply "public" telephones which can be sited in an area (e.g. the canteen) thus allowing any person involved in the Incident to contact their relatives etc. By so doing, one aspect of "welfare" is enhanced.
- 5.8 Depending on the circumstances, surrounding Police Offices could well come under increased telephone inquiries and it is good practice to increase personnel in these areas to deal with this matter.
- 5.9 As mentioned elsewhere in this report, handheld telephones can be of tremendous assistance provided "air space" is available. For a standard fee, the operators of these systems will exclude from a designated area, all users other than those identified by the Control Centre.

6. RADIO RESOURCES

- 6.1 It could well be that radio communications will prove to be inadequate at the start of the Incident and although this problem will be resolved eventually, possibly by use of mobile base stations and increased equipment, it is likely that RAYNET will appear at the scene. This organisation is referred to elsewhere in this report and although they will provide an adequate service, clearly they are no substitute for a good police radio system.

- 6.2 In the early stages, it may be an option to seek an input of mobile base stations and their attendant equipment from surrounding Forces who will probably be supplying personnel under Mutual Aid in any event.
- 6.3 Consideration should be given to having a radio base within the Operations Room as well as the other buildings in use if for no other reason than providing a second line of communication.
- 6.4 There is merit in having a dedicated radio operator attached to individual ground units thus relieving unit supervisors of that role and thereby centralising all radio traffic.

7. PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM

- 7.1 If the Control Centre has a public address system, there can be distinct advantages in its use, particularly in the very early stages. However, it should not be used in any Conference Rooms or certain dedicated Offices and, if being used, should be under Police control.
8. Another aspect of communication worth mentioning is the tremendous value in having at least one daily de-briefing session, at a set hour, in a dedicated area, and involving as many heads of individual services and agencies as can be permitted, bearing in mind the possibility of moving into the field of confidentiality and a "need-to-know" basis.

7.

SUPPLIES

1. In any Major Incident, personnel involved require to be supplied with equipment to allow them to perform their tasks efficiently.
2. To achieve this objective, it is essential that such personnel are not diverted from their tasks by having to locate, seek and arrange any supplies they may require.
3. Therefore, it is important to set up a Supplies Store, suitably staffed, in a proper location at an early stage.

4.

Location

- 4.1 The supplies store should be situated near to, but separate from, the Incident Control Centre for a variety of reasons, not the least being that it would then be outwith the Incident Control Centre security area. This then allows personnel, and deliveries, access without the need to pass through rigid control points, thereby minimising time spent passing through these points.
- 4.2 If possible, it should be located near to any marshalling or briefing area thereby allowing personnel rapid access to supplies required.

5.

Size and Interior

- 5.1 The store should be, ideally, of fairly large dimensions, leaning more towards the size of a double garage rather than a large cupboard.
- 5.2 Adequate shelving is essential and it is good practice to have the surface area of A4 size with a similar space between each row.
- 5.3 A security cabinet would be advantageous for the storing of the more valuable supplies.
- 5.4 At least one telephone is essential but there is merit in having at least two particularly in the early stages of the Incident.
- 5.5 The use of a fax machine would be of benefit in that lists of supplies required could be relayed by that machine rather than by telephone thus leaving the latter free for use.

6.

Staffing

6.1

The Officer in Charge (the Quartermaster) should be an officer of rank thus allowing a degree of supervisory control over personnel calling for supplies.

6.2

He should be assisted by at least two other persons, one of whom could well be a civilian with "stores" experience.

6.3

If possible, the input of a 'local' person is desirable as it allows easier lines of communication to be established with potential localised suppliers, as well as more rapidly identifying these suppliers.

7.

It is probably good practice for Forces to have possibly centralised within Emergency Planning Departments, a list of suppliers, with out-of-hours contact points. These lists would be able to identify the suppliers of all equipment likely to be required on a "one-off" basis.

8.

At an early stage of the Incident, an instruction should be issued to all personnel involved that requests for supplies of any description are to be actioned by the Quartermaster only.

8.1

Failure to do so will result in supplies requests being actioned directly by various units involved, particularly when they become formalised within the Incident sphere. For example, if a C.I.D. Enquiry Unit is set up, they will require the necessary furniture, fittings and office equipment to allow them to function. It is possible that they may request supplies direct and also through the Quartermaster whereby a 'double' order is made.

9.

The Quartermaster should consider himself as an arm of the Operations Team and regard the Incident Commander as his immediate supervisor. He should also attend the daily de-briefing sessions thus allowing him to anticipate the direction of the Incident and the likely requirement for supplies.

8.

EMERGENCY SERVICES

1.

When a Major Incident involving fire and injury occurs there is obviously, a need for Emergency Services other than only the Police to attend. These services include the Fire Brigade and Ambulance Service and both were in attendance at the Lockerbie Disaster.

2.

AMBULANCE SERVICE

2.1

In common with the Police and the Fire Brigade, the Ambulance Service has a Major Incident Plan and this was implemented on the night of the Disaster.

2.2

A Major Incident, in Ambulance Service terms is defined as "one which requires special arrangements to cope with the number of live casualties it produces." Unfortunately, this Disaster was not a Major Incident for that Service but nevertheless, the Plan was as stated, implemented. The following remarks are made from that viewpoint, i.e. the Service did everything the Plan suggested except deal with casualties.

2.3

Several points are worthy of mention as, if there had been a major role for the Service to play, there could well have been an effect on the initial stages of the incident.

2.3.1

communications were no better for the Ambulance Service than they were for any other Service;

2.3.2

a tremendous number of vehicles and personnel attended from five Scottish Ambulance Areas and one English area to the extent that their presence was almost overwhelming;

2.3.3

because of communications difficulties, attending vehicles could not be stopped and turned back en route and all appeared at the designated Casualty Station to the point of saturation;

2.3.4

confusion arose as to who was "Ambulance Incident Officer" to the extent that "bids" were being made by Senior Officers from the host area as well as some of the other areas;

2.3.5

many vehicles left their home stations without first filling their fuel tanks, resulting in difficulties for further travel;

2.3.6

vehicles were left with lights on and engines off resulting in flat batteries and, as at paragraph 2.3.5, possibly obstructing the area; and

2.3.7 the input by so many personnel and vehicles could, had their continued presence been required, severely restricted the number of front-line ambulances, available at their base stations; a problem for areas outwith the Incident;

2.4 Incident Commanders should where there is an input by the Ambulance Service, clearly identify the Ambulance Incident Officer and establish direct lines of communication to ensure a commonality of objectives in a structured and controlled manner.

3. FIRE BRIGADE

3.1 The Fire Brigade will also implement their Major Incident Plan and assistance will be given as required, from other Brigade areas. Such assistance is, generally, supplied in the 'domino' system which means that home-base areas are not left without minimum cover thus enabling the various Brigades supplying mutual aid to at least partly fulfill their own objectives.

3.2 The Brigade could well suffer the same communications problems as other services and they may have the additional set-back of lack of water supplies.

3.3 Again, too many appliances can arrive because of the enthusiasm of mutual aid dispatchers and the lack of communication to stop those not required en route.

3.4 Clearly, the Fire Brigade have well structured plans for Major Incidents and obviously reap the benefits of exercising. They will pursue their particular goals in line with their procedures but there is a distinct possibility that, as their fire fighting requirements start to fall, Brigade personnel may encroach on matters which should more properly, be left to the Police. It is important that the Police Incident Commander meets with the Firemaster at an early stage in order that mutual understanding of different objectives can be achieved in a controlled manner.

4. Both Services will, if necessary call out the W.R.V.S. or like organisation for support to their own personnel. They will also have attend at the scene their own in-house mechanics to deal, on site, with any vehicular problems. In the Lockerbie Disaster for example, several vehicles suffered punctures due to the amount of aircraft wreckage lying on the streets.

5. As stated, it is important that the Police Incident Commander establishes communications with the Firemaster and the Chief Ambulance Officer at an early stage and there is merit in including personnel from these services into any Incident Team as soon as

possible. Such personnel would need to have executive powers similar to the Police input.

6. In the long term, there is merit in including representatives from both Services in training exercises and active cross-pollination of abilities and procedures should be a major objective. Clearly, established lines of communication and personal contact pre-incident will prove to be of great benefit to all Emergency Services at any Major Incident.

9. MILITARY AID

1. Whenever a large-scale disaster such as the Lockerbie Incident occurs, military assistance, in a variety of guises, will arrive at the scene.

2. GENERAL

- 2.1 For the first 48 hours such assistance can be regarded as 'voluntary' but after that time, if such aid is still required, the Chief Constable hosting the incident must then follow the guidelines set for obtaining Military Aid to the Civil Powers (MACP).

- 2.2 In military terms MACP is denoted as Military Aid to the Civil Communities (MACC) or Military Aid to the Civil Ministries (MACM).

- 2.3 When an official request is made under the banner of MACP it is processed through the Scottish Office to Military Headquarters who will action the request and on a point of interest it is worth bearing in mind that a request for assistance of 150 personnel could be actioned to supply 50 Army, 50 Navy, and 50 Royal Air Force units. In other words, MACP is regarded as a Tri-Service response.

- 2.4 When a request under MACP is made it is good practice to clearly identify the proposed tasking of the Military in line with their skills. For example, it is unlikely that Military assistance will be given to provide personnel for mortuary duties, medical 'scribes' etc. Also it is important that the Ministry of Defence are made aware that the assistance can not be provided by 'non military' sources.

- 2.5 Military Units attending are self-sufficient in terms of transport, equipment, administration, etc., and will invariably provide themselves with any accommodation required for resting their personnel in the early stages. In the longer term and depending on the proximity of Military Bases, accommodation may be required.

- 2.6 It should be appreciated that there is much the Military can do in large scale disasters and it is good practice for the Police managers to have a clear picture in their minds of such resources.

3. INITIAL RESPONSE

- 3.1 In a disaster or incident where an aircraft is involved or where there is a need for a search and rescue in-put it is almost certain that the appropriate Rescue and Co-ordination Centre will be advised.

- 3.2 There are two such Centres in the United Kingdom, one in Edinburgh (RCCE) and the other in Cornwall. Both supply a 24 hour cover and their areas of responsibility are split across country roughly in line with Birmingham.
- 3.3 On receipt of such an alert, the RCCE will task Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters from various Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Air Force (RAF) bases within their control area.
- 3.4 The SAR helicopters will perform a variety of functions apart from their primary role. They will transport Mountain Rescue Teams, Medical Teams, Equipment, Operational Personnel, in fact, they will readily perform any task within their capabilities.
- 3.5 Incident Commanders therefore should be aware that SAR helicopters will arrive very quickly at the scene and probably bring the resources mentioned. Such an influx of personnel at an early stage requires direction and structured guidance.

4. SECONDARY RESPONSE

- 4.1 A secondary response, if the Incident so merits, will likely be the Army.
- 4.2 Their arrival at the scene is obviously not as early as SAR resources. However they will be in post within a matter of hours, depending on locations, and will attend as if MACP had been authorised.
- 4.3 The Army although taking more time to arrive, will arrive able to sustain cohesive units whereas the RAF and RN support resources will take longer to become established.
- 4.4 Albeit that Military Aid is in situ, it is likely, because of communications and mobilisation difficulties, that the RCCE will be regarded by the Tri-Service input as the focal point of their control structure until it can be localised at the scene.
- 4.5 Because of the increase in Incidents necessitating Military assistance it is likely that a Senior Officer will be dispatched to the locus to assume 'hands-on' command. It is imperative that this Officer, who assumes command of all military assistance (but see paragraph 4.6) becomes part of the operational team, maintaining close contact with the Incident Commander.
- 4.6 Army Headquarters will, as the incident settles, co-ordinate Tri-Service support with the exception of the Air Salvage and Transportation Flight from RAF Abingdon.

- 4.7 This Unit have a special relationship with the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) who will automatically action them to attend any incident where they (the AAIB) are involved. In such circumstances that Flight is controlled by the AAIB.

5. SUPPLEMENTARY REMARKS

- 5.1 The scale of the disaster will dictate the input of SAR helicopters numerically and these must be subjected to a degree of air traffic control whereby the possibility of 'fratricide' is minimised. Although this is something that can only be actioned by the Military, it is advisable that the Incident Commander bears this point in mind. The Military will if possible and if necessary resolve the situation by means of a mobile local air traffic control.
- 5.2 If the Military input is fairly extensive it is good practice to designate a holding area for them outwith the incident area and actively encourage their Commanders only to attend Incident Control.
- 5.3 By proper communication, use can be made of Military transport and communications systems if such is required. However it is worth bearing in mind that the Army Mould radio system suffers from the same constraints as any other by way of distance, terrain etc.
- 5.4 In common with other non-police resources, the Military will not appreciate the Police requirements vis-a-vis the preservation of evidence and a structured approach. Consequently it is good practice to clearly define the Police objectives to them at the earliest possible stage.

6. CONCLUSION

- 6.1 As regards Military input, it is of great benefit to the Operation for the Police Personnel Control Officer and the Traffic Transport Controller to establish open and direct communication lines with their counterparts in the Military thus keeping themselves apprised of numbers of personnel and vehicles.

10.

VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS

1. *The above heading refers solely to organisations who are not generally regarded as an automatic part of the Emergency Services but who nonetheless, are usually involved in one way or another, at the loci of disasters.*

2. *This particular section refers to the men and women who were on duty at Lockerbie representing many Hill & Mountain Rescue Organisations, S.A.R.D.A. (Search & Rescue Dogs Association) RAYNET (Radio Amateurs Emergency Network), W.R.V.S., Red Cross, Salvation Army, Forestry Commission, Ladies Circle, S.W.R.I. (Scottish Womens Rural Institute), Samaritans, and many others representing organisations at local level.*

3. *It should be borne in mind that many of these organisations are established locally, nationally and internationally and have their own lines of communication to most Countries. This is especially true of the Red Cross and Raynet and they can be regarded as a source of information, from the site, to members of their organisation further afield. For example, the Red Cross in America, who were contacted by some of the relatives there, were in touch with the Red Cross in this country.*

4. *While it is true to say that such organisations are staffed by dedicated and well-intentioned volunteers, the dangers attendant upon this line of third party communication are obvious.*

5. *Many of these organisations are activated by Regional Emergency Plans while others are self-activating. Many of them will arrive "uninvited" and unannounced particularly the Hill & Mountain Rescue Organisations. Indeed, it is a fact to state that a tremendous number of people will attend at the scene either attached to an organisation or as an individual.*

6. *The sheer logistics of identifying and controlling these people is something that must be addressed firmly and rapidly particularly as regards those organisations involved physically in the Incident (searching as against feeding).*

7. *In common with several other services and agencies attending, these organisations so involved will have difficulty in appreciating the Police requirement of preserving the integrity of the Incident and dealing with it in a structured manner. It is vital that every effort is made to ensure that a full understanding is achieved at an early stage and that they do not regard themselves in isolation.*

8. At the same time it should be remembered that they have all attended, in their own time, as volunteers, extremely anxious to help in any way they can. Overall, it is a matter which requires a great deal of diplomacy on a number of fronts.

9. For the purposes of this report, it may be of benefit to comment on such organisations under individual headings thus highlighting experiences peculiar to a particular organisation followed by further general remarks.

9.1 S.A.R.D.A. - The dogs used by this organisation are trained to detect human scent either from a body or from items with human scent thereon. They are not really suitable for use in 'line' searches and work off the leash and should not be regarded as trained in Police dog terms.

In the Lockerbie Incident, they were able to detect human remains to a depth of four feet under aircraft wreckage and were an extremely useful resource in that regard. However, because of the presence of noxious fumes (in this case, aviation fuel) the dogs are only able to work for short periods at a time, about 20 minutes, with rest periods, off-site, in between. To ensure maximum use is made of their expertise, it is necessary to devise a "shift" system and this can be accomplished by consultation with their controller.

Team members will be self sufficient in many regards in relation to suitable clothing, footwear and 'in-house' communications. They will generally be physically fit and adept at map-reading.

Many members of the various Hill & Mountain Rescue organisations are in fact also members of S.A.R.D.A. S.A.R.D.A. will operate their own call-out system and one spin-off from this is that when the S.A.R.D.A. member of (e.g. a Hill Rescue Organisation is called out as a S.A.R.D.A. member, very often he will advise his own organisation resulting in them also attending.

It is important to be aware of the number of S.A.R.D.A. handlers required and that any requests for additional resources are actioned by them only after discussion with the Personnel Control Officer.

9.2 RAYNET - This organisation is already included by several Regions as part of their Emergency Plans and will thus be called out by them automatically. Their members will also attend without being specifically called out.

They also have their own internal call out systems and will rapidly be at the scene with their communications. They will usually endeavour to report to the Control Centre but will attach themselves to Emergency Services personnel without any particular instructions to do so.

All members of RAYNET are highly trained in their own systems and are enthusiastic and dedicated volunteers who can provide a fairly extensive radio network (See also Section 6 of this report).

It is worth bearing in mind several points in regard to their use and presence at an Incident.

- 9.2.1 the frequency used is insecure;
- 9.2.2 their system of message transference involves several operators (depending on distance from base station) and this can cause confusion, delay and mis-interpretation, particularly when Police 'jargon' is being used.
- 9.2.3 all messages received and sent by every operator are hand-written causing further delay;
- 9.2.4 their operators are not vetted and can include persons of interest to the Police as well as members of the press;

9.3

W.R.V.S., RED CROSS AND SALVATION ARMY - In common with other organisations, all three mentioned are included in some Regional Emergency Plans and are called out automatically. Failing such notification, all three organisations will attend by self-activation. The Red Cross and Salvation Army will be on site at a very early stage.

They are all very professional in their tasks and their dedication and commitment is outstanding. Each has its own call-out procedure and can readily amass a substantial number of personnel. All of them have their own clear objectives and will remain on duty throughout.

It is worth bearing in mind that there is, generally speaking, a Red Cross Hall in most towns and the presence of that building can be very useful as a focal point for certain aspects if required.

While the W.R.V.S. and Salvation Army concentrate in the main on the supply of refreshment and feeding, the Red Cross will also prove useful in dealing with minor injuries on site for Incident personnel as well as any casualties. They will prove useful too at Mortuaries and other areas where Incident personnel may be working in harrowing conditions.

It is fair to say that all three organisations will prove invaluable and will not cause any problems to Operations. However, it is good practice to ensure that they identify with the Police Liaison Unit so that any matter causing them concern can be dealt with. It is important that cognisance is taken of their presence and that every effort is made to action any request they may make.

It may be that they should be included as a matter of course in every Regional Emergency Plan.

In the longer term, it may be good practice to have an Officer in every Force identified as a Liaison Officer maintaining a knowledge of their capabilities and establishing a clear line of communication.

9.4.

HILL & MOUNTAIN RESCUE ORGANISATIONS - If a Major Incident occurs whereby encompassing a rural area, a large number of such groups will attend by their own volition. All of them are used to working alongside the Police and indeed, many of them have Police Officers amongst their members. Some in fact comprise of a fair mixture of civilian and police personnel under the control of the Force concerned.

All of them have clothing suitable for hill searches and are highly skilled in that regard. Usually they will have their own in-house communications link and indeed, can be regarded, in similar terms as the members of S.A.R.D.A.

The remarks made in relation to S.A.R.D.A. apply equally to these organisations.

9.5

FORESTRY COMMISSION - Although not a 'rescue' organisation, it is worth bearing in mind that the commission will have vehicles suitable for use on most terrains their personnel will have local geographical knowledge of the rural areas as well as a supply of "Forestry Maps." They also have their own communications system and their Rangers can be of value when used in Search Teams.

9.6

OTHER AGENCIES/ORGANISATIONS - Many more "local" organisations will show willing to be involved but again their input needs to be structured through links, between them, Regional Authorities and the Police Liaison Unit.

Social Workers will arrive in large numbers offering support to the Community and to Incident personnel. The Samaritans may well become involved also and while both organisations have a role to play, they will offer their services to Incident personnel. If a decision is made to use their services, it must again be under direction. If not, it is possible that Incident Personnel will find themselves being approached, uninvited, by these agencies, in the canteen areas etc., which instead of relieving any stress, will cause it. Far better to set aside a room staffed by these people, advertise their presence and hours of duty to all personnel and let any counselling take place confidentially.

Post Incident discussions with various local groups clearly indicated that most members of the Community will want to become involved. In fact, they will experience a feeling of helplessness if they do not. The local Rotary may well offer to organise site clearance after the Police have finished, the Womens Guild will probably donate baking as will the Ladies Circle. Scouts, Guides, Boys Brigade, Round Table and many other such groups will readily offer their services. Bearing in mind the long term view and the eventual return to some sort of normality, it may well be good practice to allow such Groups to help in any way they can; by doing so the Police Officers involved will be establishing closer links with the Community and in fact, could be regarded as working together side-by-side. In other words, closer links with the Community will be forged and that can only be beneficial.

10. *It is important to stress, again that a large number of people under various guises will arrive quickly at the Incident site, including those whose only interest is "sight-seeing." These people apart, the others will be very anxious to help and take action, controlled or otherwise. If no direction is given, they will go and do what they perceive as needing to be done. It is therefore vital to establish a highly profiled command post, easily located.*

11. *Again, it is important to stress that they are fully (and firmly) advised that they are there to achieve the Chief Constable's objectives and must be prepared to work under the umbrella of his management units.*

11. MEDICAL SUPPORT

1. In any Major Incident where death or injury occurs there will obviously be a Medical input on a sliding scale dependant on the numbers of dead and injured and also to any other areas of the subsequent enquiry which dictate a medical input.
2. Right at the start of a Major Incident requiring an input of medical personnel, two distinct scenarios will develop, one at the site and one at the receiving hospital. Again depending upon the circumstances each will develop further or cease at an early stage.

3. RECEIVING HOSPITAL

- 3.1 Most hospitals which have a Casualty Department will also have a Major Accident Plan which will be implemented under the auspices of the Health Board concerned.
- 3.2 Much of the plan refers to in-house procedures and is rightly of no particular concern to the Police. However, some of the wider issues relative to the plan are of interest and these can include:
 - 3.2.1 the call-out procedure which is well documented and works in both theory and practice. However the scale of the Disaster can cause hospital personnel, not actioned through the call-out procedure, to attend by self motivation. The effect of this is that so many personnel attend access routes can rapidly become blocked for ambulance arrival purely because of the attendance level;
 - 3.2.2 consideration of expansion of the Police input at the hospital to include an overview of matters other than just casualty arrival. In other words, while it remains good practice to retain a Police presence relative to casualty flow and documentation it is worth considering Police traffic control points at an early stage;
 - 3.2.3 the possible lack of profiled leadership at a central point within the hospital thus giving rise to a lack of direction and a duplication of instructions and requirements. It is therefore important that the Police in attendance clearly identify with the person in overall command within that establishment;
 - 3.2.4 a loss of communications because of the large number of telephone enquiries; and

3.2.5 *mis-information put out by the media for reasons best known to themselves. For instance, in the Lockerbie Disaster, the media broadcast an appeal for off-duty hospital personnel to report for duty. They did so without any consultation whatsoever and exacerbated the problems as at paragraph 3.2.1. Also, because so many personnel attended the logistics of managing such numbers diverted the energies of controllers at a time when their concentration was required elsewhere. Another example of media interference was an appeal for blood donors to attend at the hospital concerned. Again this was something the media did without direction or consultation and their lack of thought served to increase pressures on the already hard pressed hospital staff.*

3.3 *Clearly there is merit in establishing good communication lines with hospital managers at an early stage to ensure that mutual objectives are dove-tailed and actioned to the benefit of the forward progress of the incident.*

4. ON SITE MEDICAL PERSONNEL

4.1 *Local Doctors and medical personnel will attend voluntarily or as a result of being actioned by the Police or some other agency.*

4.2 *Several matters will be highlighted, not the least being the arrival of medical personnel from further afield. These people will attend as a result of self-motivation or as being actioned by some agency already attending. For example a Doctor from England appeared at the site in the early hours voluntarily. He had had experience of disasters in England and upon his arrival at Lockerbie, set off without any consultation whatsoever, round the area tagging bodies. Although very commendable his actions caused utter confusion to the search teams in the early stages.*

4.3 *A team of medical personnel were automatically actioned by an RAF Rescue Unit who also transported them by helicopter to the site unannounced and without direction.*

4.4 *Although most medical personnel did make their presence known to the Police, the foregoing re-emphasises the need to rapidly establish a clearly identified central control as soon as possible.*

4.5 *Invariably, medical personnel attending will not have any identifying features and it is of assistance for them to wear tabards with "Doctor" denoted thereon.*

- 4.6 Consideration should be given to establishing a senior medical officer in the Control Centre, whereby liaison can be easily achieved. His role would be to react to Operational requirements as well as responding to his own personnel. As the incident develops, many of the materials required for Mortuary duties, etc., can be actioned through him by the Quartermaster. Indeed the presence of an on-site Medical Officer will prove of great benefit, particularly as a focal point for the many other branches of the medical profession that will appear (i.e. psychiatrists, pathologists, radiographers, etc.,)
5. Medical input in relation to mortuary functions is mentioned elsewhere in this report but at this stage, it is worth noting the following points:-
- 5.1 in any aircraft accident involving service aircraft an RAF Group Captain and his team are automatically actioned. They are highly skilled and experienced in this particular field and are extremely knowledgeable in this regard. It may be that this team should be automatically actioned in all incidents involving aircraft whether service or civilian and that the Group Captain appointed as Head Pathologist or at least as second-in-command of that function;
- 5.2 consider tasking junior doctors, via the Medical Officer, to act as "scribes" at the mortuary. Not only do they understand the medical jargon, it would serve as a training/educational programme for them;
- 5.3 do not assume that any Head Pathologist will transpose the maxims and practices in use for single homicide cases to the investigation of multiple unlawful killings. It is good practice for the guidelines to be clearly defined by the Investigators at an early stage.
6. Generally it could be very easy for the Operational Team to leave the medical profession to their own devices and there is no doubt that they would ably fulfil their role. However it is important to remember that they are very much an integral part of the team and as such, must be in close contact with any operational aspects.
7. On a point of interest the following comment appeared in the British Medical Journal in 1975 -
"Britain can expect an incident of disaster proportions to occur on average at the rate of two per year and herein lies the main problem: persuading everyone to accept that a disaster may happen in their area and to devote sufficient time, effort and resources to the plan."

8. At the time of writing, several Major Incidents, including the Lockerbie Disaster have occurred within a period of three months viz:-

Rail Crash	-	Clapham
Rail Crash	-	Purley
Rail Crash	-	Glasgow, and
Aircraft Crash	-	East Midlands.

All involved the loss of life and casualties and all required an on-site input from the medical profession.

10. It may be that the medical profession should be regarded as the "fourth" emergency service and if so, should all members of the medical profession likely to be involved, be they hospital doctors, general practitioners, nurses or paramedic personnel, be aware of how the various services respond and how they relate together?

11. There may well be merit in including medical personnel in various exercises as a matter of course.

12.

MORTUARY

1. *The heading of this paper is taken to include all matters relative to victim processing and ranges from the finding of the body, through the various processes relative to transportation, examination at the mortuary, identification of victims, to eventual release of the remains to relatives. Reference is also made to the Casualty Bureau and C.R.I.S.I.S. input.*

2. *In most Major Incidents, the Emergency Services find themselves dealing with survivors and deceased. Tragically there were no survivors from the Lockerbie Air Disaster in that all 259 people aboard the aircraft were killed as well as 11 residents from the town of Lockerbie.*
 - 2.1 *Five local people were injured and being "casualties" attended at a designated hospital. Three were allowed home after treatment while the remaining two were detained. None of the casualties came into the classification of seriously injured.*
 - 2.2 *Survivor procedures therefore did not apply in that regard but action was required in relation to 270 deceased.*

3. *In the majority of Major Incidents where there are a number of deceased it is fair to say that the recovery of the bodies is confined to a small area (e.g. Bradford Fire, Manchester Airport Disaster, Clapham Train Crash etc.) thus allowing a degree of "on-site" control and without any great problems as regards terrain and spread of area.*
 - 3.1 *Every Major Incident involving injury and death will have its own particular facet as regards the conditions appertaining to the body itself and to the conditions in which it lies.*
 - 3.2 *In any event, the recognised procedures in relation to medical examination and the gathering of evidence will be followed, tailored to meet the demands on the particular Incident. There is no need to record these basic procedures in this report but the following remarks are submitted for information and future consideration.*
 - 3.3 *However it may be of interest to briefly outline the situation as regards victim areas relative to the Lockerbie Air Disaster, bearing in mind that all the deaths were caused as a result of a criminal act.*

3.4 Bodies of victims from the aircraft were spread over a large area which encompassed the town of Lockerbie itself and the surrounding countryside. The latter comprised a variety of terrains including a golf course, moorland, fields, bogs and marshes. The victims were found in a variety of circumstances; residents identified were burnt and destroyed beyond visual identification; people from the stricken aircraft impacted at around 128 miles per hour and were found in the open countryside or enmeshed in aircraft wreckage; in one particular sector, victims had to be separated from wreckage some 15 feet in depth; others fell onto houses and buildings and some became entangled in rafters and rooves.

3.5 Bodies and human remains were recovered some 5 miles away from the town and "finds" ranged from a whole body to a single finger. The "whole" bodies were obviously very seriously disfigured and some 650 bags of human remains were also processed.

3.6 Resources involved in the recovery and processing of the victims were faced with an horrendous task which had to be accomplished quickly and professionally and within the parameter of preservation of evidence and the dignity of the deceased.

4. Victim Recovery

Although not necessary in areas of close dimensions, Ordnance Survey Maps to the scale showing field boundaries are essential to accurately plot the position of each "find" (see paper 13 - Property).

4.2 This particular exercise becomes important not only for accurate recording in relation to any judicial proceedings etc., but also for the relatives. As time progresses, relatives will visit the Incident area and will ask the exact location where their loved one was found. By being able to action such requests, the professionalism of the Service can only be enhanced.

4.3 Bearing in mind the state of the bodies, it is possible that personnel involved in the site recovery will require a certain amount of protective clothing, particularly suitable medical-type gloves to act as a barrier to any body fluids emanating from the deceased.

4.4 There is a requirement to ensure that weather resistant labels and ties are available for use in tagging body finds. The present standard Production label does not withstand the elements and any plastic bags used to protect same are inclined to be blown off by the wind.

- 4.5 *It is good practice to ensure that all search and recovery teams have a supply of the appropriate Interpol Victim Identification Forms and are conversant with its completion.*
- 4.6 *Suitable transport in adequate quantity is also essential and this can comprise helicopters, ambulances and multi-terrain type vehicles.*
- 4.7 *Personnel involved in recovery in areas where there is a large quantity of aircraft wreckage may require special footwear. As an example part of the cargo of the aircraft was a box of sewing needles which punctured wellingtons and less substantial footwear causing injury to some Officers.*
- 4.8 *Without any doubt whatsoever, it is abundantly clear that the present standard body bags are utterly useless in an Incident dealing with mutilated bodies. The present body bags are not of sufficient strength and very easily ripped open by bones sticking out. They do not allow bodies to be easily inserted especially those with every bone broken. Bearing in mind how difficult it is for a person to grip wet plastic, these bags need carrying handles. Without exception, every officer using these body bags has criticised their effectiveness and therefore active consideration must be given to a more suitable body bag for this type of recovery.*
- 4.9 *It is good practice to include in briefing sessions involving personnel dealing with the use of body bags an instruction that used body bags are not disposed of until after forensic examination. The reason for this practice is that victims near the point of explosion can be implanted with small fragments from various articles propelled by the effects of the blast. On many occasions, such implants can not be discovered by visual examination, especially if the body is mutilated. During transportation in the body bags, these items can fall out of the body and although lost from it will be contained within that bag, provided the body bags are constructed of suitable material.*
- 4.10 *Similarly, it is also good practice to brief search and recovery teams not to include with the body, in the bag, articles which may be lying nearby, scattered about. If for example, a body is found unclothed, as many of them were, then to include a jacket found nearby in the body bag could well indicate to the processing team that all items within the bag have a common origin. In fact, the opposite could well be the case and it is better to mark any such items, if they are included as being "found nearby."*

5. Mortuary Operations

- 5.1 Very often, a temporary mortuary is set up at the scene of a Major Incident and its projected use is regarded as short term until the bodies are removed to proper mortuary facilities at a hospital or a recognised mortuary. However, where early indications are received that a large number of bodies can be expected, time must be taken to identify a suitable building for fairly long-term use.
- 5.2 Ideally, the building identified should be all on one level with an abundance of space, adjoining rooms, water, power points, ventilation, office and canteen facilities. A large warehouse may well be a good choice and an ice rink could also be considered. If the latter is used, the coolness therein is an advantage to a certain extent but if bodies are left lying on the ice, they will freeze causing problems for further examination and processing. However the use of wooden pallets upon which to place the bodies will overcome any problems in that regard.
- 5.3 If the building is one which allows secluded vehicular access so much the better as the media will set up camp at the mortuary hoping for the "exclusive" picture. Security of the building must also be considered.
- 5.4 Once the body arrives at the mortuary, the various processes will fall into place and a system commensurate with the tasks in hand will evolve. If circumstances permit, it may be that the most practicable system for body processing, accompanied by the appropriate Forms and documentation is:-
- 5.4.1 external examination of body, seizure and documentation of property, further photography if necessary;
 - 5.4.2 fingerprint impressions taken. If done before post-mortem, the possible contact with body fluids is much reduced;
 - 5.4.3 radiology examination whereby the X-ray will allow accurate cataloguing of injuries and dental characteristics as well as the discovery of any prosthetic insertions such as orthopaedic plates, artificial valves, etc., and also the presence or otherwise of any particular material embedded within the body as a result of an explosive blast or items of personal jewellery which may also have been displaced into the body by that effect. Many of these results may well assist in eventual identification.
 - 5.4.4 post mortem examination, and,
 - 5.4.5 odontological examination.

- 5.5 Throughout this process, medical personnel will require to be accompanied at all stages by "scribes." These people, if Police Officers, should be able to equate with medical terminology but there is merit in having this function performed by junior Doctors. They do not require any education as regards terminology and they would be increasing their medical experience.
- 5.6 It is important to stress, once more (see paper 11 - Medical Support) that it should not be assumed that the Head Pathologist will fully appreciate the dictates of evidence gathering and clear instructions should be given to his team, particularly as regards a very full X-ray examination.
- 5.7 It is also beneficial to set up a support administrative unit to link with supplies, communications, productions, Health & Safety, Welfare, Logging of all personnel and supervision of the completion of all forms and documentation.
- 5.8 Police managers should never under-estimate the dedication and professionalism of police personnel working in mortuaries. Rotation of personnel can easily be undertaken by management for the best of reasons but sometimes more stress can be caused by so doing rather than allowing the same 'team' to finish the task. This is one area where "hands on" supervision is very necessary to allow proper reaction to personal requirements or demands.
- 5.9 Mention has been made of the commercial firm of Kenyons who are of great assistance in Incidents involving aircraft disasters and they will embalm the bodies once the processes have been completed. There is merit in allocating space within the mortuary to permit this function thus reducing the need for further transportation of the bodies. However, efforts must be made to ensure that some sort of separation exists, particularly because of the embalming process which requires copious amounts of toxic and noxious chemicals such as naphthalene, formalin and glutaraldehyde. Adequate and positive ventilation is therefore extremely important.

6. Victim Identification

- 6.1 The most important aspect of this part of victim processing is accuracy.
- 6.2 In any Incident where a large number of victims are being dealt with, it is good practice to set up a Victim Identification Bureau whose task is as the title suggests. The tools of their trade are communication and receipt of information, intelligence and hard facts. The Bureau will be the centre point of all information gained from body processing, relatives, Casualty Bureau and other agencies.

6.3 It is important to set up such a Bureau at an early stage and there is great merit in appointing a Detective Officer as Officer in Charge. The Bureau will require administrative support to service the detective and uniformed officers so attached. Dedicated liaison is required between the Bureau and areas where information relative to victims can be obtained and there is merit in having a C.R.I.S.I.S. terminal installed.

6.4 Communication with the Procurator Fiscal is essential as is contact with the Registrar.

6.5 The scale of the Incident will dictate the size of this Bureau. They will be subjected to pressures from relatives who seek the early release of the victims but the personnel therein must be totally satisfied as to the identity of a victim before passing on to the next process.

7. Body Release

7.1 Understandably, in any situation involving deceased persons, which results in the release of the victim being controlled by the relevant authorities, much pressure is brought to bear on these authorities by the relatives.

7.2 In an Incident involving large numbers of victims, allied always with human tragedy, that pressure can be immense not only from the relatives but also from others, such as politicians, acting on their behalf.

7.3 It is therefore a matter which requires to be dealt with professionally, accurately and with diplomacy. To this end, there is merit in establishing a unit dedicated to this task and under the supervision of an officer of rank commensurate with the scale of the Incident.

7.4 At an early stage, it is good practice to define policies and requirements to achieve this objective and this can be attained by a discussion between all interested parties such as the Procurator Fiscal, Kenyons, Casualty Bureau and any other interested agency involved in the particular Incident. At Lockerbie this included the American Embassy, Pan Am and other national representatives as and when appropriate.

- 7.5 *Cognisance must be taken of the fact that many countries and Religious Groups deal with their dead in a different manner and while this is acknowledged, at the end of the day the requirements of Scottish Law can not be avoided.*
- 7.6 *Various documentation is required to permit the release of a victim and it is necessary to establish what further documentation is required by some countries before they will accept delivery of a body.*
- 7.7 *This unit should be regarded as an integral part of the whole victim processing exercise.*

8. Casualty Bureau

- 8.1 *In any Major Incident involving multiple deaths and serious injury, a Casualty Bureau is automatically set up and the procedures relative to its functions are well documented in various Force Orders etc.*
- 8.2 *In Incidents involving survivors there is a requirement to set up an "on-site" Casualty Clearing Station and/or a Rest Centre (for the less seriously injured) and the procedures relevant to that type of Incident are also well documented.*
- 8.3 *However where there are no survivors, the Casualty Bureau will be purely administrative as against physical. In other words, their personnel will not be required at the scene, receiving hospitals etc. With this in mind, there is merit in setting up a Casualty Bureau in a neighbouring Force area thus relieving the "host" Force of the multitude of inquiries that can be expected. This aspect is probably more applicable where the "host" Force is fairly small.*
- 8.4 *The purpose of a Casualty Bureau is to process all enquiries and information regarding persons killed or injured in the Incident and well established paper systems have been evolved in this regard.*
- 8.5 *However, the Casualty Bureau glean much information which could and will assist in the identification of the victims. It is imperative therefore that the Casualty Bureau is regarded, irrespective of distance apart as an integral part of the Victim Identification process and must link closely with any Unit set up under that heading.*

- 8.6 It may be of interest to make mention at this juncture of other "Casualty Bureaux" which could be set up in an Incident particularly one involving aircraft where the "host" Force has no knowledge, initially, of their existence.
- 8.7 Some years ago, British Airways while recognising that the management of an air disaster is in the hands of the Police Authority in whose area the accident occurs, took cognisance of their own legal and moral responsibilities for passengers and next of kin and developed a system known as E.P.I.C. (Emergency Procedures Information Centre).
- 8.7.1 E.P.I.C. is located in the basement of the Queens Building at Heathrow Airport and is staffed by personnel from British Airways supported by a team of Metropolitan Police Officers whose function is to act as liaison officers between E.P.I.C. and the "host" Force.
- 8.7.2 It is operated by British Airways and is available to some 40 member airlines operating into the United Kingdom and will be actioned in support of Incident Authorities for incidents in this country and abroad.
- 8.7.3 E.P.I.C. is able to obtain information from airline sources worldwide such as details of all passengers and crew, baggage, cargo, mail, etc., and is therefore an organisation which can assist the Incident Management Teams.
- 8.7.4 Their systems are compatible with those of Kenyons particularly as regard identification and repatriation of victims.
- 8.7.5 Incident teams should be aware that they will impart information to relatives and it is important to identify to E.P.I.C. the relevant policies of the Incident Commander so that a degree of commonality can be achieved, especially in an Incident caused by a criminal act. Similarly, an element of communication between their Press Officer and the Police is essential. It is worthy of mention that uncontrolled actions by various agencies can cause further distress to the next of kin.
- 8.8 The firm referred to in this report as Kenyons (Kenyons Emergency Services Ltd) provides a service to deal with victims of any civil air crash which occurs in the United Kingdom or which involves any British Aircraft so stricken overseas.
- 8.8.1 Their remit is divided into five main areas viz:-
(a) recovery of the remains
(b) identification
(c) arrangements for disposal
(d) removal to the place of disposal and final disposal by burial or cremation, and,
(e) recovery, renovation, cleaning and identification of personal and other effects.

- 8.8.2 They will also be in regular contact with next of kin and other interested parties. They have a great deal of experience in disasters involving multiple deaths and will prove a useful source of information and assistance to Police management teams.
- 8.8.3 However, the fact that they have seen it all before, many times over, tends to make them dictate and instruct upon operational policies to suit their own purposes. It is important therefore that any input by this firm is controlled under Police command. It should be remembered that Kenyons is a commercial firm and is very often retained by the Airline concerned (on this occasion they were called in by Pan Am) or insurers.
- 8.9. Other agencies can also set up "Casualty Bureaux" unknown to the Police involved and unless they are discovered or their presence realised then yet again, the Police teams and that agency could be working at cross purposes.
- 8.9.1 In the Lockerbie Incident, Pan Am set up their own "Casualty Bureau" which was initially not known. Fortunately within a few hours its presence was realised and appropriate action taken.
- 8.9.2 The United States of America Consulate also set up a "Casualty Bureau" and again, communication was necessary with them in that regard.
- 8.10 Clearly, all these agencies regard the setting up of "Casualty Bureaux" as one area of their response and this is perfectly understandable. However it does lead to independent operation and duplication of effort and as stated, it is important for the Police Management teams to harness and control these efforts.

9. Use of Computers

- 9.1 Following the Bradford Fire Disaster on 11 May 1985, ISIS computers, now a subsidiary of McDonnell-Douglas, developed a computer package for West Yorkshire Police for use in the identification of badly charred or mutilated bodies where means of identification are limited.
- 9.2 The package became known as C.R.I.S.I.S. (Casualty Recording Information Sorting and Identification System) and this system was used during the Lockerbie Air Disaster.

- 9.3 Such useage indicated several areas requiring adjustment not the least being the compatability of C.R.I.S.I.S. with the Interpol Victim Identification Forms. These matters have been addressed in a separate report.
- 9.4 However, assuming that the C.R.I.S.I.S. package is re-jigged, then it is essential that it has a presence in the Casualty Bureau Victim Identification Unit and H.O.L.M.E.S., although not necessary in the same room as the latter. There would be advantages in having a facility whereby C.R.I.S.I.S. and H.O.L.M.E.S. could be worked off the same data base thus reducing the need for a paper flow and duplication of effort.
- 9.5 It appears that the realisation of a professional package, along the lines of C.R.I.S.I.S. would greatly benefit the victim identification process and there is little doubt that the use of computers in this regard is the way forward.

13.

PROPERTY

1. *Procedures for the reception, control and retention of property, whether it is being treated as "Found" or destined for production in Court, are well documented in various Force Standing Orders etc.*
2. *These procedures, with minor adjustments from time to time, are practical and need no further expansion in this report. They form the base line for property matters in all events be they normal daily Police duties or Major Incidents.*
3. *However, the scale of the Lockerbie Disaster indicated several matters worthy of mention and these are denoted hereafter.*
4. *Depending on the scale of the Incident, it is good practice never to underestimate the size of premises required for property processing and storage. Consideration may also have to be given to identifying other premises to process "dedicated" property (e.g. Aircraft Wreckage).*
5. *Notwithstanding the contents of paragraphs 1 and 2, it is likely that dedicated documentation will require to be raised to augment and support the recognised systems.*
6. *The scale of the Incident will dictate the rank of the Officer in Charge of property matters and it is good practice to consider a rank with executive powers thus allowing on-site decisions to be taken and implemented within the policy framework and without constant reference to the Incident Commander.*
7. *When the position is reached that Officers are delegated to the Property Team, there is merit in looking ahead in an attempt to retain the same dedicated personnel for the duration of the Incident. Their eventual expertise built on experience will prove invaluable.*
8. *Incident Commanders should be alive to the fact that it is likely that the Major Incident will eventually be subjected to either criminal or civil court procedures and that Productions will be required. To that end, it is good practice to set up a Production Team in the early stages and in similar lines as mentioned in Paragraph 7.*

9. *Consideration should be given to using H.O.L.M.E.S. as an aid to property processing. At Lockerbie, this facility was enlarged on H.O.L.M.E.S. and proved extremely useful.*
10. *Security is very important both for the retention of property and the restricting of access by visitors, non "on-site" police officers and staff. Such security has to be maintained over a 24 hour basis as appropriate.*
11. *It is good practice to identify one officer from the Property Team as being solely responsible for the acquisition of stores and equipment. He would be in direct contact with the Quartermaster and would centralise such matters for his Department.*
12. *Health & Safety must also be borne in mind as well as the welfare of the personnel. They could well be handling items contaminated by body fluids, or other substances and these matters should be addressed in a professional manner. Consideration should be given to having each officer given an anti-tetanus injection.*
13. *If the Incident is one whereby a large number of people have an interest in property recovered, it is good practice to keep these persons apprised of the on-going situation at all times, even to the extent of being pro-active rather than re-active.*
14. *In an Incident such as Lockerbie, which was a criminal act, by use of explosives, the possibility of a secondary device must be considered and actioned accordingly.*
- 14.1 *In this regard, it is good practice to fully brief personnel involved in processing property upon its arrival even to the extent of having an input to such briefings by an explosives expert.*
- 14.2 *Such an input would allow the personnel concerned to be aware that an explosion can cause small items, such as a piece of wire or human hair, to be blown through a soft sided suitcase without leaving any visible signs on the exterior of the suitcase.*
- 14.3 *Similarly, they would be advised that any searching of items containing anything of an evidential nature should be done under controlled conditions (e.g. plastic sheeting on floors or work tables and all sweepings therefrom retained for forensic examination).*

- 14.4 The initial processing of property received is very important and the following system relative to these stages was found to be more than adequate to cover various aspects viz:-
- 14.4.1 An explosive sniffer dog checked all property upon its arrival.
 - 14.4.2 Each item was then passed through an X-ray unit.
 - 14.4.3 Where there was no reaction to either process (at Lockerbie there was not) each item, was then processed to the appropriate Sector.
 - 14.4.4 Having been so documented, each item was immediately examined for any signs of blast damage.
 - 14.4.5 Where evidence of blast damage was found the item was preserved for further forensic examination, and,
 - 14.4.6 Where no such evidence was found, each item was then processed appropriately.

15. Messrs. Kenyon were found to be invaluable in relation to their expertise as regards the cleaning of the personal items, rings, watches, etc., in preparation for the return of same.

16. Other more general matters affecting the recovery of property are worthy of mention if for no other reason than to alert future Incident Commanders so that they may be included as appropriate at any briefings likely to occur.

16.1 There is a distinct possibility that property will be received at the Property Store in such a fashion as to indicate a common source. In other words, a jacket received may well contain, in its pockets, a watch, a passport and a wallet. However further processing could well indicate four different owners. Subsequent inquiry will establish that the finders in the search area have found a jacket and scattered about nearby, a watch, a passport and a wallet. With the best of intentions the finder may well put all four items together thus causing the confusion illustrated.

16.1.1 It is good practice therefore to brief search teams to regard all items of property as individual finds or,

16.1.2 Where there is evidence suggesting the likelihood of a common source, e.g. a burst-open suitcase with clothing scattered in close proximity, that the items are marked as "found nearby."

16.2 Bearing in mind the evidential aspects of property found and showing signs of blast damage it is important to clearly identify the actual spot where the find took place.

- 16.2.1 As with victim recovery (see Paper 12 - Mortuary) it is good practice for the Sector Teams to use actual (not photo-copied) Ordnance Survey Maps to the scale of showing field boundaries. Consideration should be given to identifying a common mark to each field or area (e.g. the south east corner of a field) thus allowing finds to be accurately plotted on the map. It is good practice to appoint one Officer dedicated to plotting the finds and using his map as the authoritative document.
- 16.3 Under normal circumstances, the present production labels in use are adequate but it is important to take cognisance of the circumstances of an Incident in this regard. Points to bear in mind are:-
- 16.3.1 The weather conditions which could destroy the labels and tying materials, and,
- 16.3.2 Fluids from aircraft parts can "wash" the labels clean of any ink notations.
- It may be that in such Incidents, consideration should be given to using waterproof labels and plastic or wire ties, or supplying appropriate plastic bags to isolate the labels.
17. In any Incident involving damage to an aircraft, it is likely that some reference will be made to the presence of radioactive materials being aboard.
- 17.1 There are usually two sources of radioactivity aboard a passenger aircraft. As used in an aircraft both are totally benign but cognisance must be taken of any damage to them caused by impact or heat.
- 17.2 The sources are tritium contained in "Exit" signs and depleted uranium used as counterbalance weights.
- 17.3 Although these sources are regarded as safe under normal usage, it is good practice for the Incident Commander to introduce the subject at an early stage to avert unfounded rumour and speculation. When aircraft wreckage is being recovered there is merit in having it surveyed by a representative of the Defence Radiological Protection Service or the National Radiological Protection Board.
- 17.4 Consideration should be given to apprising those officers most likely to handle these sources of some sensible guidelines whereby the processing will be dealt with professionally and with welfare in mind viz:-
- 17.4.1 Both sources should be handled as little as possible and by persons wearing gloves.
- 17.4.2 Hands should be thoroughly washed after handling.

- 17.4.3 Handling times should be kept to a practicable minimum.
 - 17.4.4 The items should be double wrapped in polythene bags.
 - 17.4.5 The items should be marked with a radiation warning trefoil and stored separately in a brick-built area with controlled entry and again a radiation warning trefoil affixed thereto.
- 17.5 It should be stressed at such briefings that any guidelines are issued to enhance safety and not because of any danger.
18. It is likely that other personnel, apart from the teams mentioned will be required and these could include officers from Customs & Excise and Special Branch to deal with matters affecting Customs Regulations and security (e.g. Diplomatic mail, intelligence) respectively.
19. Overall in dealing with property on such a scale, it is important that the tasks be tackled professionally from the start and that any adjustments required are actioned to maximise efficiency.

14. VISITS BY V.I.P.'s AND OTHERS

1. Without doubt, any major incident will attract visits from a variety of personages, ranging from the local Member of Parliament to the Head of Government. Depending on the type of incident, visits can be expected from members of the Royal Family and also leaders from all walks of life.
2. Very often, for a variety of reasons, many of these visits will become known at extremely short notice necessitating rapid action on the part of the Police. It is good practice to centralise all types of visits to the Police Liaison Unit.
3. Obviously and dependent upon the profile of the visitor, the Chief Constable and his Deputy will require to be in attendance. If the Incident is one of some enormity, much time will require to be spent by these officers in this regard and although it may be regarded by many as time consuming, it is a very worthwhile exercise and will boost the moral of the personnel involved.
4. It is usual that visits by such personages take place during the early stages of the incident and it is possible that further visits will be made by them at a later date. It is important that the Officers tasked with escorting these, and other visitors, are properly briefed and that a commonality of information given is established.
5. The Police Liaison Unit will be able to arrange the necessary procedures and practises to be adopted in similar lines with visits in ordinary circumstances; liaise with Regional Authorities, Special Branch, Media, Operational Security etc.
6. Visits can be expected from representatives of the various religious denominations, volunteer agencies and military services and they too must be actioned in a structured and professional manner.
 - 6.1 Many of them will wish to centre on personnel from their particular agency etc., but nonetheless will wish a general tour of the incident. It is good practice to ensure that such visitors are brought under an appropriate measure of Police control. The difficulty in achieving that objective is the lack of forewarning. Some of the representatives will contact their own organisations direct to advise of their proposed visit, and unless the Police Liaison Unit has established lines of communication, these visitors could arrive at the Incident area unknown to anyone other than the particular organisation concerned.

7. From the Police point of view, many Police Officers from Forces other than the host Force will, quite naturally, wish to attend at the Incident. Interest will be expressed by Forces at national and international level and it is true to say that such visits will usually be deferred until the Incident has been on-going for some time.
 - 7.1 While this attitude is perfectly understandable and commendable, it is fair to say that by the time such Officers do arrive, the Incident has declined in intensity by a fair degree. This then precludes these Officers from viewing the situation as it really is and deprives them of the 'feel' of the situation.
 - 7.2 Bearing in mind that lessons can be learned for the benefit of the Service as a whole, there may be some merit in allowing such Officers to attend at an early stage and perhaps dedicating an officer to conduct them.
 - 7.3 This path has already been followed to a certain extent in that most Forces, hosting an Exercise, do have a large number of Police Officers in attendance as observers.
8. Looking ahead, to the finalisation of the Incident, there is merit in maintaining a record of all the persons who have visited the scene.

15. PHOTOGRAPHIC AND VIDEO UNITS

1. In any inquiry of any magnitude, maximum use will be made of equipment able to record images, be it for evidential purposes, presentation events or training packages. Such usage is conducted under Police control and is performed either by Police Officers or their civilian employees.
2. However, in incidents attracting massive and world-wide media attention many other agencies will use their own equipment to record events, usually for public information but also for in-house use - e.g. Fire Service, Medical Services, Rescue Organisations and such like. Control of this sphere is referred to elsewhere in this report.
3. The comments hereafter are made from the knowledge gleaned from viewing hours of video tapes and still photographs as well as discussion with many of the personnel involved in the taking of the videos and stills.
4. Every unit involved had lengthy footage of the crater area, Rosebank and the Cockpit. Every still photographer has many negatives of the same areas. Hindsight has revealed a paucity of video and photographic images of many other areas, not so highly profiled but nonetheless, very much a part of the incident.
5. Much duplication took place also in relation to the evidential video and still gathering. It is particularly obvious that a firm set of guidelines must be laid down at an early stage otherwise different standards will be obtained in relation to the (photographic) recording of evidence.
6. Clearly there is a need, in any major incident involving Mutual Aid Support, to appoint, at an early stage, an officer to be in charge of all such units.
7. That officer should be of Inspector rank and if possible have some experience of the capabilities of the equipment and a perception of the eventual use of the output.
8. He should be briefed personally by a member of the Command Structure and able to be contacted via the Operations Room. That briefing should clearly define the guidelines and standards to be adhered to and achieved.

9. Thereafter ALL photographers of any description, come under his control. Requests for such personnel should be channelled to him and he delegates the necessary action to personnel from the resource "pool."
10. The Inspector should include in his briefing to his "pool" that they must bear in mind, apart from the guidelines etc., the following points:-
 - 10.1 Do not video scenes etc., with the date or any other mark superimposed. Such action renders videos done in this fashion unsuitable for editing and placing in future training/presentation packages.
 - 10.2 Mark the date, locus, content and operator details onto each video cassette.
 - 10.3 Bear in mind future editing and take time over the filming of each locus instead of jumping about from one scene to the next thus resulting in erratic footage for future use, and,
 - 10.4 Make maximum use of tripod facilities, particularly with video cameras.
11. At the conclusion of every action, the operator should hand over to the Inspector concerned, the result of their work (i.e. video cassettes and film negatives).
12. He will properly document each item upon receipt and eventually be responsible for controlling any development, processing etc., required.
13. It is important to stress that all such videos and photographs are the copyright of the Chief Constable of the host Force and that all personnel involved in such incidents, either by way of mutual aid or in-Force, are under the control of that Chief Constable while on duty in his Force area.
14. The availability of the Officer in Charge of this Unit should be maintained until the conclusion of the incident/inquiry. In this regard it should be borne in mind that daily something will be taking place where the presence of a video or still camera is desirable.

15. *Eventually, this officer will require dedicated accommodation for the storage of his material and the necessary space and material to record, document and process the workings of his Department.*
- 15.1 *It is not essential that he be positioned in the Control Centre. His department could easily be accommodated within the nearest Police Office to the scene provided always that he has easy and direct contact to the Operations Room.*
16. *He should consider himself as a member of the Operations Team and regard the Incident Commander as his immediate supervisor. He should also attend the daily de-briefings to keep himself aware of the on-going situation and likely requests for the services of his Department.*

16.

THE MEDIA

1. Any major incident attracts media attention and their input is governed by the magnitude of the event as against events elsewhere. Where the incident is one of international dimensions, then they will be present in great numbers.
2. The media will arrive at the scene at a very early stage. For example, 10 members of an American broadcasting company, permanently stationed in London, arrived at Lockerbie within 2 hours of the incident and well before the influx of Mutual Aid resources.
3. Media people will be in possession of very sophisticated equipment, including cellphones. They will establish a line by using that system to their office and will keep the line open, thus causing a reduction in available airspace. In effect, their actions in this regard, dramatically reduce the effectiveness of cellphone communications for the emergency services.
4. Because of their arrival at the scene of an incident so quickly they will make every effort to establish themselves, with a degree of permanency, as close as possible to the Control Centre. If possible, they will set up at the very door of the Control Centre and rapidly install equipment capable of sending satellite pictures.
5. They will take advantage of any lack of security resources and move into the incident area, taking maximum advantage of their situation. Where an incident area is one of some magnitude such as Lockerbie Air Disaster, they will continually attempt to enter secure areas in spite of any security presence.
6. Again, where the incident is of some scale, the Media will over-fly the area either in a light aircraft or, preferably for their purposes, a helicopter.
7. As previously mentioned, their sophisticated equipment will include directional microphones and extremely powerful camera lenses. Obviously, such equipment is capable of recording events both orally and visually from a great distance and either over-fly or covertly.

8. As the incident progresses and the initial high profile begins to diminish, the media will become pro-active as against re-active. In this respect, they will actively seek out the "exclusive" whether it be to expose any weaknesses in the Police systems, "reliable witness" type interviews or any other matter associated with the Incident which will be reported as "investigative journalism" rather than previous reporting of facts.
9. They will soon become aware that personnel involved in the Incident are obliged to reside in the general area for a variety of reasons. Every effort will be made by the Media to identify the Hotels, Boarding Houses, etc., being used by such personnel and they will take full advantage of the situation to ingratiated themselves with the Incident personnel. Their sole purpose is to make full use of the "canteen gossip," or "Bar fly syndrome" thus enabling them to become party to off-duty discussion whereby they will learn of matters confidential or discreet.
10. It is essential that an officer be designated as Press Relations (P.R.O.) at an early stage. Ideally, that officer should be of rank and be experienced in such matters. He must be supported by suitably able staff.
11. His primary functions must be:
 - 11.1 the control of the Media.
 - 11.2 regular briefings to the Media by himself and a very senior Police Officer.
 - 11.3 where the incident is of such a scale so as to involve P.R.O.s from other agencies, to liaise with them and,
 - 11.4 to ensure continual consultation between various Government Departments, where such are involved, to ensure that common ground is reached to satisfy conflicting interests and there is no ambiguity regarding Press releases.
12. Suitable premises should be identified as the Media centre where they can gather and where press conferences can be held. A village hall or similar building is most suitable for this purpose. It is good practise to identify the Hall Keeper or Caretaker of the property before it is occupied by the Press and with the P.R.O. or a member of his staff, take note of the condition of the property at that time.

Without doubt when the Media finish with the premises it will be damaged and again it is good practise to identify a property not well furnished but with plenty of toilets and power points. These premises must be sited away from the Control Centre with off-street parking if possible and away from any residential area.

13. The P.R.O. and his staff must control any Media visits to the Incident area or Control Centre.
14. The premises set aside for the P.R.O. and his staff can be within the Control Centre provided that their presence does not encourage the Media to call there. If the P.R.O. is established, therein, it is imperative that adequate communications and transport is provided to enable him and his staff to go out and meet the press and to receive telephone calls.
 - 14.1 It is perfectly feasible to site the P.R.O. team in a secure (Police) building not involved in the Incident, but nearby the area. Again, telephones, telex and a Fax machine as well as transport should be available.
15. The P.R.O. from the Media aspect, should verify that the Chief Constable has invoked his powers whereby an Air Exclusion Zone has been established (see Para. 6) and should so advise the Media.
16. The P.R.O. or his Deputy should be present at all Command de-briefs, and have ready access to any member of the Command Team, at any time. However, where such de-briefs, meetings etc., are of a sensitive nature appertaining to the inquiry, it is only fair to the P.R.O. to exclude him. This allows him to retain his integrity with the Media in that he is not able, because he does not know, to impart sensitive information.
17. It is part of the P.R.O.'s functions to ensure that the Command Team have advised all personnel, Police, Military and Civilian, that only the Chief Constable will direct who speaks to the Media and that only he will decide what or what can not be said.

18. *It is also important that the P.R.O. is aware that all personnel have been advised of the equipment used by the Media and its capabilities and to be alive to the dangers associated with "off-the-cuff" type remarks, particularly in off-duty or refreshment situations.*

19. *The P.R.O. should regard the Incident Commander as his immediate supervisor and keep him abreast of the media aspects of the situation. That apart, daily contact by him to the Operations Room will permit the necessary degree of supervision essential for the welfare and resourcing of that department.*

17.

LIAISON

1. *There is no doubt that each and every Major Incident Manual produced by Police Forces contains a reference to the importance of the role of a Police Liaison Officer, usually under the title of Staff Officer.*
2. *In an Incident on a scale such as the Lockerbie Disaster, there is absolutely no doubt that this role be defined as "Police Liaison Officer" and regarded as a separate unit from any Staff Officer. Many of his functions could well come under the umbrella of Staff Officer duties but nonetheless, his is a role apart.*
3. *The Officer so appointed should be one of Superintendent Rank and from the host Force. His local knowledge and already established points of contact will prove invaluable as the Incident progresses.*
4. *He must be situated in the Control Centre and supported by an appropriate number of personnel.*
5. *The Officer concerned must at an early stage, identify his Unit to all Heads of Department, military commanders, representatives of all agencies involved, Regional authorities and Emergency Services.*
6. *Although the Unit should be in the Control Centre, it should be apart from the Operations Room but with easy and direct communication. However, the Unit should regard itself as an integral part of the Operations Team.*
7. *Depending always on the scale of the Incident and the variety of personnel involved, the demands made of the Unit will be continuous and varied.*
8. *Apart from the essential liaison with all Police departments involved, the Unit will deal with such matters as, for example:-*
 - 8.1 *Identifying and securing accommodation for Police, Military, agency and Volunteer personnel even to the extent of ensuring that any dogs being used in the incident can also be accommodated;*
 - 8.2 *Liaising with a variety of Regional Authorities, including the Emergency Planning Department, Social Work, Property Services and so forth;*

- 8.3 Being a focal point for relatives of the victims and injured and liaising with the various Religious leaders and representatives of third tier agencies;
 - 8.4 Responding to the needs of all non-police, services and agencies, whereby any particular problem or query can be resolved (e.g. - the location of the nearest vet to treat search dogs, the whereabouts of a garage for petrol etc.)
 - 8.5 Maintaining lines of communication with the local Community Groups.
 - 8.6 Organising various V.I.P. visits and similar events.
9. In fact the Police Liaison Unit will deal with the multitude of queries that could be regarded as minor but are in fact very much a part of the professional approach expected of the Police by the Public, especially during such Incidents.
10. The presence of the Unit will permit the Operations Team to concentrate on the Incident by taking on board these and other matters and will always keep them apprised of the on-going situation.
11. It is important to stress that the efforts of this worthwhile Unit may not be fully utilised unless their presence is made known to all incident personnel. At an early stage, their location and terms of remit should be circulated bearing in mind that there could well be a duplication of action between the Unit, the Operations Team and the Quartermaster. It is therefore, vital that the Unit actively pursue and maintain open and direct lines of communication at all times.

WELFARE

1. *The most important resource at any major incident, is manpower and it is imperative therefore that every effort is made to utilise this resource to maximum efficiency and effectiveness. (The same is true in normal circumstances).*
2. *While the direction of such personnel is of primary importance, a great deal of effort requires to be made to supply the necessary support. In other words, by taking the appropriate actions to raise and maintain a level of morale, that major resource will achieve the defined objectives and goals more professionally, quicker and with a greater sense of achievement.*
3. *The support necessary, particularly in an Incident such as this, must go a great deal further than feeding arrangements, cleaning of offices and toilets or ensuring transport availability between the Incident area and the home Forces. Albeit these aspects are very important they are only a part of the overall scenario and cognisance must be taken of the place and type of duty, suitable specialised clothing, availability of medical attention, off-duty accommodation and stress related counselling.*
4. *Several of the points mentioned will be established at an early stage and once established, will function without the need for any input other than supervisory or assessment. Cleaning and feeding arrangements soon fall into a routine as does transport and accommodation. Specialised clothing and equipment will require more of an input and that will relate to the obtaining of same rather than supply through the Quartermaster.*
5. *In fact, the more tangible matters are, relatively speaking, fairly simple to action. The difficulties arise in actioning the rather nebulous aspects of morale welfare.*
6. *In this regard, it is fair to say that stress in the Police Service has been highly profiled in recent years, particularly by the service managers and service associations. In an incident such as the Lockerbie Disaster, where personnel are required to deal with so many bodies and human remains, even greater cognisance has to be taken of this aspect.*

7. *When a search team or mortuary unit has attached a number of medical personnel and/or Red Cross volunteers, consideration should be given to having the Senior Officer in Charge of these teams and units discussing the matter with a member of the medical support, seeking assistance in identifying symptoms of stress. Such a discussion should be confidential and will depend on the communicative skills of the Senior Officer and the medical personnel to establish mutual trust and a perception of a common objective.*
8. *Similarly, all personnel should be advised, in general terms of the possibility of stress affecting them and this advice should be more specific as the rank structure increases. It may be worthy of consideration to identify a room easily accessible, staffed by Welfare Personnel, where any officer so inclined can attend confidentially.*
9. *Police families should not be forgotten and it may be good practice to have them visited by a civilian welfare officer. If the families concerned form part of a close-knit community it is of more benefit if the "visitor" is a "stranger" rather than one attached to their home force or area.*
10. *Particular attention must be paid to those personnel working in extremely harrowing conditions (e.g. mortuary duties) as well as those working in physically tiring areas (recovery of bodies, searches etc).*
- 10.1 *It is feasible to establish a mortuary 'team' with a Sergeant in charge of each group. Part of his duties should be the rotation of his group's personnel so that different tasks are spread evenly, with periods of rest/refreshment built in. In other words, each such group should be able to constantly match the medical input while at the same time being self contained for the purposes of relief.*
- 10.2 *As previously intimated, welfare remains foremost in the minds of police managers and one resolution always considered and invariably actioned is to rotate personnel to entirely different duties (e.g. from mortuary duties to security staffing). While such a move seems sensible and good management it can affect the morale of the officers concerned for the following reasons:-*
- 10.3 *Officers attending a Major Incident are detailed and briefed initially for a specific role. Clearly defined objectives are given to them in relation to that area and as time progresses, they will settle to the task in hand and at the same time, either consciously or unconsciously, develop a "team" spirit during their efforts to attain a common goal.*

10.4

Bearing the foregoing in mind, when personnel are rotated to a different task, and are replaced by other officers to complete their original task, then these officers do experience a sense of frustration and seem to prefer to be left to complete their original duties. It may be that management is more concerned about stress than the actual officers themselves but nonetheless, it is an area that requires a constant overview.

11.

Overall, it is vitally important that Supervisory Officers remain alive to the possibility of stress and that lines of communication are maintained between them, their supervisors and most important, their subordinates.

19.

GENERAL

1. *The following comments are submitted in no particular order and for the purpose of profiling various matters which came to notice during the Lockerbie Incident. They may well be of interest to future Incident Commanders.*
2. *The Metropolitan Police at Heathrow have a dedicated team of Police Officers trained in various aspects of victim processing and identification. They are, to a degree self sufficient in that they have their own equipment and documentation.*
3. *It is likely that in any Incident involving multiple deaths they will offer their assistance and can have a team of 20 or so personnel on site within 15-20 hours. The benefit of their training will be apparent but a similar input can be achieved "in-Force" depending on the availability of personnel.*
4. *If Incident Commanders accept their offer of assistance, it is good practice to clearly articulate that they appear under the auspices of Mutual Aid and as such, fall under the command, control and direction of the host Force.*
5. *It is essential to use H.O.L.M.E.S. as the central point for the recording and retention of all matters relative to the Incident over and above the normal input relative to the actual investigative aspect.*
6. *The requirement for Police Officers to be conversant with the system of using grid references to identify a particular location is minimal under normal circumstances. However, there may be merit in including a brief training package on these skills at Probationer Training level. Alternatively a supply of appropriately styled "Aide Memoirs" would assist in overcoming any difficulties in this regard.*
7. *When supplies have been requisitioned, particularly as regards clothing and footwear, cognisance must be taken of the smaller sizes required by Policewomen.*
8. *In any Incident similar to the circumstances of Lockerbie where vast areas had to be searched in a structured manner, sectorisation of the area is the only practicable way forward, with each sector having a dedicated team. While recognising the difficulties attendant upon the same personnel remaining with each sector, every effort should be made to have this achieved.*

- 8.1 By doing so, the need for lengthy daily briefings is much reduced thus allowing more on-site work to be done. This is particularly important when field activity is confined to the hours of available daylight.
- 8.2 One positive aspect of retaining a dedicated team until the task is finished is that the personnel concerned will very soon develop a "team" spirit and combine to achieve common goals. Completion of the task will result in enhancement of morale along the lines of "a job well done."
- 8.3 As mentioned elsewhere, Police managers should never underestimate the professionalism and abilities of their subordinates and while "stress" is high on the list in the minds of the managers, the same is not true in the case of their subordinates. It is clear that a team of personnel, given a task and properly briefed, experience tremendous frustration if they are removed from that task leaving it to be completed by others.
- 8.4 In an Incident such as Lockerbie where a criminal act is the cause, there is merit in appointing a Detective Officer as Sector Commander. However, it is good practice to support him by a Uniformed Officer of rank skilled in the procedures relating to search and the direction of large numbers of resources.
- 8.5 Where sector teams are working some distance away from the Control Centre, it is essential that they receive any support required and that their needs are serviced. It is of great benefit to have a recognised Rendezvous Point (e.g. a porta-cabin or a 'bus, etc.,) in each sector and the supply of toilet facilities should also be actioned.
- 8.6 Where the Incident is one where personnel are required to perform tasks in large areas, it is beneficial to include in each team, at least one officer who, through local knowledge, is familiar with the geography of the area.
9. When an incident is one where there will be a substantial C.I.D. input and that input is likely to be protracted, a C.I.D. Administration Unit should be set up at an early stage.
- 9.1 This Unit will service the requirements of the Senior Investigators as well as being the focal point for all matters relative to C.I.D. personnel. It will establish direct and constant communications with the Operations Room thereby establishing a commonality of purpose and a reduction of duplicated effort.

10. *On-site visits by Senior Command Officers is good for morale, the assessment of the situation and will allow the reception of any matters requiring attention.*

11. *Regular daily de-briefing sessions are essential and they should be attended by all sector leaders, heads of agencies and services as well as the appropriate personnel from the Command and Control Teams. Minutes should be taken of these briefings and circulated to interested parties.*

- 11.1 *In this regard, a Conference Room should be available to all agencies involved as they require it.*

12. *If Incident personnel are required to travel abroad on inquiries, it is important to establish proper insurance cover as well as rates of allowance which differ from country to country.*

13. *Where Police personnel are travelling long distances from their home Force to the Incident, they should be able to do so with a fair degree of comfort.*

- 13.1 *If possible, it is better to use "Police" transport but often circumstances dictate the use of hired coaches and personnel carriers. Consideration should be given to having some means of communication aboard such transport but it should be borne in mind that the Incident area could contain roads and byeways over which coaches can not negotiate.*

- 13.2 *When diving teams are being used, it is important to be aware that diving is a particularly physical exercise and therefore a dedicated officer may be required as a driver only.*

14. *The scale of the Incident will dictate the number and size of various "groups," "Departments" or "Units" set up. In that type of scenario, there is merit in each unit identifying a liaison officer whose task it is to maintain contact and exchange dialogue with his counterparts in all other units.*

15. *Where the Incident is one which has Non-Police expert witnesses as part of its resource personnel it is good practice to have them briefed so that they have a better understanding of any Judicial requirements.*

15.1 Many things accepted by Police Officers as a matter of course are not appreciated by Non-Police resources and such briefings should include information to the effect:

15.1.1 the investigation is likely to end up in court.

15.1.2 the procedure for seizure of productions and continuity of evidence in that regard.

15.1.3 define corroboration and what it means.

15.1.4 why Police Officers need to be present at all material times of recovery of items, and,

15.1.5 the need to submit detailed statements as to their actions and conclusions as soon as possible.

15.2 There is merit in giving personnel in this category, particularly those regarded as experts, a notebook to record appropriate notes and to have these notebooks handed in to the Police at the finish of their involvement.

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