Civil Aviation and Military Aircraft

Standard Operating Procedure

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If you are responding to an aircraft in distress, missing aircraft, air accident or incident which has occurred and you have not read this document

**Do Not Read It Now**

Ensure the control room has contacted a force Air Accident and Incident Advisor (AAIA), who will provide immediate response, health and safety and evidence preservation advice.

See Sections 13.11 to 13.18 for generic outer cordon advice.
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1. Purpose

1.1 This Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) supports the Police Service of Scotland, hereafter referred to as Police Scotland, Specialist Operations Policy.

1.2 It provides information in relation to dealing with:
- An Aircraft in Distress
- Missing Aircraft
- Air Accident or Incident
- Airspace Restriction and Management

1.3 This SOP does not cover the policing of airports or aircraft accidents or incidents at or in the close vicinity of airports. For further information in relation to these, please see the Policing of Airports SOP and the relevant major incident plan. Bomb calls for aircraft in flight and hi-jack procedures are also covered in the Policing of Airports SOP. Procedures specific to the police air support unit are contained within the Air Support Unit SOP.

1.4 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), also known as drones, are not covered by this SOP. For further information, see the UAS guidance available on the force intranet, or contact a force Civil Aviation Authority Liaison Officer (CAALO) or Air Accident and Incident Advisor (AAIA). Both can be contacted via a police control room or by e-mailing OSD Aviation Safety (OSDAviationSafety@scotland.pnn.police.uk).

1.5 This SOP should be read in conjunction with the force Major Incident Plan.

2. Air Accident and Incident Advisor (AAIA)

2.1 Police Scotland has a cadre of Road Policing Forensic Investigators who are trained to provide specialist advice for and respond to air accidents and incidents. On a daily basis the AAIA’s are on Road Patrol and other duties throughout the force area and are well placed to respond rapidly when required. They provide advice to emergency service first responders from the outset of the incident and continue their involvement, attending the scene to identify health and safety issues, recognise and protect evidence, recording that which might be lost before other experts attend and working in parallel with the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB), by carrying out air accident scene surveys. On occasions when the AAIB will not attend an air accident, the AAIA will be the only specialist advisor supporting the Police Incident Officer (PIO).

2.2 When a Police Scotland control room receive a call regarding any aircraft accident or incident, an AAIA must be contacted immediately. Early notification to an AAIA will optimise the opportunity for the AAIA to consider the safety implications for responders attending the scene and to contact them.
directly via Airwave before their arrival, to provide advice before responders interact with the accident or incident scene.

2.3 A Police Scotland AAIA must be informed immediately a police control room becomes aware of any;

- Aircraft in distress (an aircraft crew who declare an emergency)
- Aircraft which is reported missing or overdue at its destination
- Air accident or incident, including ground incidents and reports of unmanned aircraft incidents
- Need for airspace restriction to be implemented and managed in response to any kind of incident (e.g. crime scene which is exposed to UAS activity, Marauding Terrorist Firearms Incident etc.)

2.4 On-duty AAIA’s details can be found on SCoPE by searching under ‘Contact Database’, ‘Specialism’, highlight ‘AAIA – Air Accident and Incident Advisor’ and click on ‘search’.

2.5 For aircraft in distress, missing aircraft, air accidents or urgent airspace restriction matters, if no AAIA is on duty or the on duty AAIA’s are not available, an off-duty AAIA must be contacted without delay.

2.6 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS’s), better known as drones, are also aircraft in law and the person controlling one is a pilot. The law regarding the use of UAS’s is complex, so if staff at the police control room receive a call relating to the use of a UAS, they should contact an AAIA for advice.

2.7 Once an AAIA has been made aware of any air incident, they will make direct contact with the attending officers and provide advice and guidance on the following;

- Searching for missing aircraft
- Approaching an air accident scene or scenes,
- General Health and Safety,
- Risks associated with the particular incident / aircraft,
- Protocols concerning cordons etc.,
- The preservation of evidence and
- Where a UAS is concerned, legal and procedural advice.

2.8 For air accidents and certain other incidents, the AAIA is responsible for informing the AAIB. The AAIA will thereafter liaise with the AAIB or Defence Accident Investigation Branch (DAIB) and Royal Air Force Liaison Officer for Scotland (RAFRLO) in cases involving a military service aircraft.

2.9 Where necessary, AAIA’s will attend the scene to record evidence with or on behalf of other investigative authorities.
2.10 During any incident involving an air accident, an AAIA Incident Co-ordinator will co-ordinate AAIA activities in support of the PIO and to act in the interest of Police Scotland and other emergency responders. Subject to approval by the senior officer in charge of the incident, AAIA’s will deploy in teams of two to the scene or scenes and the total number of AAIA’s deployed will depend on the scale of the incident. The number of scenes, predicted amount of work at each scene and environmental conditions will determine how the AAIA co-ordinator advises the deployment of the AAIA teams.

2.11 **Emergency Procedures Advisor (EPA)** - The PIO should seek the assistance of an Emergency Procedures Advisor (EPA) at an early stage, to assist with advice on the managing the scene with regards to the Forward Control Point (FCP), Rendezvous Point (RVP), traffic management at the scene, Partnership working, translators services, Survivor Reception and Family and Friends Reception Centres, any evacuation of properties which is required etc. The EPA is contactable through the police control room and will support the PIO in all aspects of the role. EPA’s train PIO’s, so to have an EPA at the scene is a valuable asset.

3. **Civil Aviation Authority Liaison Officer (CAALO)**

3.1 Police Scotland Civil Aviation Authority Liaison Officers (CAALO’s) are AAIA’s who have received further training to deal with Unmanned Aircraft matters, airspace restriction, management and enforcement, event planning and event or crime scene protection involving matters related to aviation.

3.2 During an event or the response to an air accident or any other kind of major incident, the CAALO, through the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and Department for Transport (DfT), may request that an appropriate volume of airspace be restricted ‘in the public interest’. This may protect the scene from aerial threats where pictures from above may compromise the safety or security of those working within the scene, or stop aerial images revealing and making public information which may otherwise be used as specialist criminal knowledge.

3.3 Where airspace restrictions are granted, the CAALO will then take legal ownership of the management of that restricted airspace on behalf of the senior police officer in charge of the event or incident. More information regarding airspace restriction and management is available at Section 26 in this SOP.

4. **Disaster Victim Identification (DVI)**

4.1 When any incident occurs which results in multiple fatalities, the respectful and dignified recovery of the deceased victims is a clear priority.
4.2 UK Police Services’ Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) teams have a common approach to the recovery of victims in such circumstances. They are trained to recover the victims in the most difficult and harrowing of circumstances, but to work methodically and ensure the forensic recovery of human remains.

4.3 The task of recovering deceased victims from air accidents must be carried out by UK police Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) teams. The police control room will contact the on-call DVI representative at an early stage, in circumstances where it becomes clear that their expertise is required. DVI teams will work with the AAIA’s at the scene to ensure their work carried out safely and is accurately recorded.

5. **Royal Air Force Distress and Diversion Cell**

5.1 The Royal Air Force, Distress and Diversion Cell based at Swanwick, Hampshire provide assistance by radio to any aircraft in distress, civil or military within Scottish airspace. They maintain a listening watch on civil and military emergency radio frequencies.

5.2 The force control rooms and thereafter the AAIA will liaise with the Distress and Diversion cell in the event of an air accident or incident.

6. **Air Traffic Services**

6.1 Air traffic services for most areas of the UK north of Newcastle are provided by National Air Traffic Services (NATS) based at the Scottish Air Traffic Control Centre, Atlantic House, Prestwick.

6.2 The force control rooms and AAIA will liaise with NATS and/or the local Air Traffic Control (ATC) equivalent where necessary when responding to an air accident or incident.

7. **Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)**

7.1 Police Scotland have initial responsibility for the investigation of all air accidents on Scottish territory and waters. Crime Division, Major Investigation Teams (MIT’s) take the lead in these investigations where there has been a death, or criminality, either through criminal intent or negligence, is inferred.

7.2 In the case of crashed civil aircraft (or in certain other circumstances involving military accidents or where an accident nearly occurred), notification of the air accident or incident will be passed by the AAIA to the AAIB at the earliest appropriate stage.
7.3 Where there has been a fatality, or an incident which is likely to result in a fatality, where the incident occurred in unusual circumstances or where there is a public interest case, the AAIB will send an investigation team to the scene. This team may include large numbers of investigators, engineers and other aviation experts. The number of investigators depends entirely on the nature of the incident or how the investigation progresses.

7.4 The investigation team(s) will usually comprise of a small advanced party who will attend the area of the crash as soon as possible, followed by the main body of the investigation team thereafter.

7.5 The AAIB may take 8 to 24 hours to arrive on scene, depending on the time of day of the incident and the incident location.

7.6 The AAIA and the MIT will liaise with the AAIB representatives throughout the incident response and inquiry stages, but it is important to understand that the AAIB run a parallel inquiry, which is independent of the police inquiry.

7.7 The AAIB inquiry seeks to establish what happened and identify any safety lessons to be learned. The AAIB do NOT seek to apportion blame and are obliged by law not to pass certain information to the police inquiry team. To pass information to the police would be to commit an offence.

7.8 The AAIA can provide information on the relationship between the Police and AAIB inquiries.

8. Air Rescue Services

8.1 The Aeronautical Rescue and Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) directs air assets for the purposes of Search and Rescue (SAR) operations and forms part of the National Maritime Operations Centre (NMOC) at Fareham, England. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) assets conduct SAR Operations in response to both aeronautical and marine emergencies.

8.2 Police contact with the NMOC must be through the police control room, or the AAIA.

9. Distress Signals

9.1 When an aircraft crew require immediate assistance a number of signals may be used:

- Visual signalling by any means of the international distress signal (... --- ...); or
- A succession of red flares; or
- Sound signalling of the international distress signal by any means other than radio.
OFFICIAL

9.2 An indication of an aircraft requiring assistance, but not of as urgent a nature as above, may be given by displaying a number of white flares or the repeated switching on and off of the aircraft's landing and navigation lights. Low flying by aircraft is not necessarily an indication of distress or difficulties.

10. General Information Required – Aircraft in Distress / Missing / Accident

10.1 The following information should be sought by the police control room and immediately passed to the AAIA, but there must not be a delay informing the AAIA of the incident if all the information is not quickly available,

a) Type, nationality and/or registration mark of aircraft,
b) Nature of distress, if not an accident,
c) Location, direction of flight, speed and altitude (if still airborne),
d) Date and time (local time) of accident/distress call,
e) Name of owner, operator and hirer, if available,
f) Name of person in command of the aircraft (Aircraft captain or senior pilot),
g) Last point of departure and intended destination,
h) Location of aircraft by reference to some easily definable geographical point if possible,
i) Number of persons on board the aircraft (crew and passengers),
j) Number of persons (i) killed; (ii) seriously injured (iii) injured - if applicable and known,
k) Nature of accident as far as is known,
l) Brief particulars of damage to aircraft,
m) Whether there is or has been a fire in the air or on the ground,
n) Weather conditions at site (if an accident),
o) Action already taken by reporter,
p) If the public already interacting with the crash scene.

10.2 The police control room should also pass the name and Airwave Point to Point number for a Police Officer attending or at the scene and for the PIO, if appointed to the AAIA so direct contact can be made.

11. Crashed Military Aircraft

11.1 Initial reports of a crashed military aircraft should be made to the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff Duty Officer (DCDSDO) by the police control room or the AAIA.
12. **Incident Management**

12.1 **Aircraft in Distress**

12.1.1 Where the police control room becomes aware of an aircraft in distress, or where an air crew has declared an emergency, the airport to which the aircraft intends to land at must be informed as per the Airports Policing SOP.

12.1.2 The police control room must also inform an AAIA immediately.

12.1.3 The officers at the receiving airport will be notified of the situation and the AAIA will monitor the incident and consider the range of advice required if the aircraft has an accident at the airport, or where the aircraft does not come down where intended.

12.2 **Missing Aircraft**

12.2.1 Missing aircraft can be reported to the police by anyone, but usually reports are received from:

- The aerodrome or other airfield where the missing aircraft was expected to arrive
- Missing air crews family members or friends
- Other aviators
- Air Traffic Control (ATC)
- Distress and Diversion cell

12.2.2 When an aircraft is reported missing, the police control room must create an incident and notify an AAIA.

12.2.3 If a general location is known for the last reported position of an aircraft, local officers should be made aware and respond on the ground. A PIO should be appointed to organise local resources and consider what action will be taken should an air accident locus be discovered. The AAIA will contact the PIO directly to provide advice.

12.2.4 Early consideration should be given as to the deployment of the Police Scotland Air Support Unit (ASU). The police helicopter may be able to quickly locate a missing aircraft if it has come down.

12.2.5 It should be kept in mind however that the police helicopter is not equipped to winch or carry people additional to the ASU crew. The crew of a missing aircraft, if located, may require immediate medical care, therefore early consideration must also be given to the police control room contacting the NMOC and requesting MCA SAR assets are dispatched. This is particularly important where the air accident or incident may have resulted in the crew entering water. The MCA SAR should be contacted immediately if recovery of persons from the water is a possibility.
12.3 Air Accidents

12.3.1 When an air accident occurs the police control room will dispatch local resources to attend the scene or scenes and must inform an AAIA without delay. It is crucial that the AAIA be given as much notice as is possible in order to gather safety information relating to the specific aircraft that has come down, if known, and to provide either specific, or generic advice to first responders. It is safest to get that advice to responders before they reach a scene, or in a case where there is more than one aircraft, or the aircraft has broken up in flight, there will be more than one scene on which to advise. Detective Officers should also be made aware of the accident at the earliest possible opportunity.

12.3.2 At the scene(s), including on occasions where fire-fighting and rescue operations are taking place, the PIO will be responsible for co-ordination of all activity at the scene and for initiating certain ancillary activities, depending on the circumstances. The PIO should consider the location of a Forward Control Point (FCP), Rendezvous Point (RVP) and cordons. It is particularly important to consider wind direction and gradient at the scene or scenes in relation to these points and where cordon officers may be located. They should always be located upwind of the incident and uphill from the incident, if possible. The generic duties of a PIO are contained within the Major Incidents – Response, Roles and Structures SOP, but for air accidents, the AAIA and EPA will closely advise the PIO.

12.3.3 Where fire-fighting is on-going, the senior fire fighter at the scene will be in command of the inner cordon, sometimes referred to as the ‘hot zone’ and Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS) will lead the incident until the fire is extinguished and the inner cordon area stabilised. The PIO will still be responsible for overall co-ordination of the incident and will take over charge once SFRS are satisfied with the situation in the inner cordon. The EPA will provide advice where required on the role of the PIO within the multi-agency approach to dealing with air accidents.

12.3.4 It should be noted that, with regard to off aerodrome air accidents or incidents, the fire service only attend on a very small percentage of occasions, because there is no fire involved at the point where the aircraft is discovered. On the vast majority of occasions, the AAIA will provide safety advice relating to the crashed aircraft, at the scene. If the scene is in a remote location, the Police Scotland and local voluntary Mountain Rescue Teams (MRT’s) may provide safety advice in relation to accessing and working in such an environment.

12.3.5 For air accidents or incidents at sea, or inland tidal water, the MCA will initially take the lead role and co-ordinate rescue and recovery activities. The MCA are not an investigative authority and the PIO will still co-ordinate all land based activity and multi-agency work relating to the incident. This will be done from the most appropriate location. Again, an AAIA and EPA can advise the PIO in the early stages of the enquiry, on a case by case basis. Detective Officers will again lead such investigations in the early stages and so local DO’s should be notified as early as is practicable.
12.4 Military Aircraft

12.4.1 Police Scotland will retain primacy at all aircraft crash and accident sites in Scotland. In the event of a military aircraft accident, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Duty Officer (DCDSDO) will be responsible for the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Aircraft Post-Crash Management (APCM) procedures. The DCDSDO will retain command and control of all military personnel until they are deployed at the scene.

12.4.2 Once the MOD arrive at the scene, it is the MOD Post Crash Management Incident Officer (PCMIO) who will be the senior MOD representative and will assume command and control of all MOD personnel and their activities.

12.4.3 The MOD PCMIO will attend the scene as soon as practicable, departing from their parent unit within three hours of being notified of the incident.

12.4.4 The MOD PCMIO will provide command and control of military personnel at the scene until a Site Clearance Certificate is signed. This could be some weeks after the date of the incident in question.

12.4.5 A military Aircraft Recovery Officer (ARO) and Joint Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Squadron (JARTS) team will be provided to assist the MOD PCMIO and PIO. The ARO will control inner cordon activity at the site in behalf of the MOD PCMIO.

13. Cordons

13.1 All aircraft crash sites, regardless of aircraft size, have the potential to contain an exceptionally dangerous mix of hazards. Aircraft present a significant hazard to health, even if they appear to be relatively undamaged following an air accident or incident. The nature of some aircraft hazards are listed at Section 18.

13.2 Survivor, first responder and public safety have primacy when dealing with any stage of an air accident or incident. Once a scene has been risk assessed by trained personnel, made as safe as is possible through risk mitigation and staff provided with the appropriate level of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for their role at the scene, the dignified recovery of deceased victims must be completed as soon as is safely possible. Staff at the scene should continually dynamically risk assess the scene to optimise risk mitigation.

13.3 The task of recovering deceased victims must be carried out by UK police Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) teams.

13.4 The police control room will contact the on-call DVI representative at an early stage in circumstances where their work requires to be carried out.
13.5 Each air accident or incident scene (including airport ground incidents at aerodromes) should initially be treated as crime scenes. Furthermore, the investigation site to which an aircraft is removed will also be treated as extremely hazardous and may also be a crime scene.

13.6 Preservation of evidence from the outset of an incident is crucial, as there is a duty to find out what may have happened as quickly as possible in case other aircraft of the type involved in the incident require to be grounded for public safety reasons.

13.7 Poor protection of evidence from the outset of an incident may lead to causation factors being missed and may contribute to further incidents if the loss of evidence causes a missed opportunity to identify a causation factor which may be common to other aircraft.

13.8 As soon as is possible, cordons must be established at an accident or incident site. The AAIA will advise on the initial cordon size, as cordons will be different on a case by case basis and will depend upon several variable factors.

13.9 The AAIA will instigate procedures for the airspace above the scene or scenes of an air accident to be restricted and managed. This will be achieved through a CAALO. Consideration of the restriction of airspace is vital to ensure Police Scotland control all cordon dimensions of the crime scene, both horizontally and vertically. **Airspace restriction must be sought as a matter of urgency** and the AAIA will advise the PIO in this regard.

13.9 Where there is a fire, the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service will have control of the inner cordon and will dictate the inner cordon size. The Scottish Fire and Rescue, Fire Incident Commander (FIC) or National Inter-agency Liaison Officer (NILO) will liaise with the PIO and AAIA regarding cordon sizes.

13.10 Where there is no fire, or where the fire service cannot attend the scene, initial inner cordons sizes will be decided upon by either the PIO who will be advised by an AAIA.

13.11 **Information has been removed due to its content being exempt in terms of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, Section 35, Law Enforcement.**

13.12 Once the outer cordon and safe routes within the cordon have been established, no persons should be allowed to enter it until it has been assessed by qualified experts. Even then, only essential personnel may enter the outer cordon with the authority of the person in charge of the scene. The only exception to this is for SFRS personnel to fight fire or assess fire risk.

13.13 Ideally, emergency responders approaching such a scene should be wearing robust footwear, Tyvek suits, doubled up rubber gloves taped at the cuffs, FFP3 standard face masks and eye protection. If emergency responders risk assess that they are able and willing to approach an accident or incident
scene closer than the advised cordon size in order to save life, they should approach the scene;

- **From upwind.** in other words with the wind blowing from behind them, blowing any smoke, vapours or airborne fibres (which may well include MMMF’s and/or radioactive debris) away from them.

- **With the possible exception of incidents involving a helicopter,** officers should also approach by **walking downhill towards the scene,** if possible, as fluids and vapours (that may be extremely dangerous to inhale) may seep downhill.

13.14 **Where a helicopter has been involved in an accident or incident** and may still have its rotor blades rotating, responders should keep in mind that the bladed may cause **fatal injuries** if contact is made.

13.15 Where a helicopter is on a slope, the rotor blades may rotate very close to the ground because of the angle of the helicopter to the ground and the blades may not be visible due to high rotation speeds.

13.16 Responders should not approach any helicopter in operation, but they must **not** approach a helicopter with rotating blades following an accident or incident until advice has been sought from an AAIA, **regardless of the circumstances.**

13.17 **Other than with helicopters with rotating blades,** if officers do assess scene risks and make a decision to approach the scene in urgent circumstances to save life,

- **No personal Airwave** radio should be taken within **20 metres of the aircraft or part thereof** and

- **No vehicle Airwave** should come within **50 metres of the aircraft or part thereof.**

- **No person should get within 20 metres** of any debris at a military aircraft accident or incident. If munitions were aboard the aircraft, physical or electronic disturbance of damaged munitions may cause a devastating explosion. Munitions may not be immediately identifiable, so it is recommended that responders remain at the safe cordon distance.

13.18 If emergency responders feel any ill effects whatsoever when getting close to a scene, they must **withdraw immediately and inform the control room without delay.** If police officers become aware of any other emergency responder feeling any ill effects, they should advise the police control room of,

- What the ill effects were and

- In what location the ill effects were felt.

14. **Evidence Preservation and Security**
14.1 For air accidents or incidents where a death occurs, or where criminal involvement is suspected, a Crime Scene Manager (CSM) will be appointed, who will manage the scene appropriately. The following paragraphs are for information and reference where no CSM has as yet been, or will be appointed.

14.2 Experience indicates that aircraft crashes in or on the fringes of urban areas attract particularly large crowds and effective outer cordons, organised early in the incident should keep such crowds of people away from the scene in the interest of responder and public health and safety and to protect evidence.

14.3 The removal of, or interference with any small and apparently insignificant item may result in the loss of vital evidence of the cause of the accident.

14.4 Important evidence can be found on survivors of air accidents and if responders do find themselves entering aircraft and assisting to remove occupants, they must take great care not to interfere with aircraft systems, or to move switches or control levers, as the position of the controls at the point of an accident is vital evidence. **Before entering** any aircraft ensure you have advice of an AAIA.

14.5 Officers should record a note of where each person was within the aircraft before they were removed. This may be of vital evidential importance.

14.6 If it is possible to establish the identity of persons removed from aircraft, details should be recorded and passed to the PIO.

14.7 Clothing worn by aircraft occupants can also be important and should always initially treated as forensic evidence. Advice should be sought from the senior Investigating officer in this regard.

14.8 Whilst the removal of passengers' baggage or other belongings may be approved by other investigating authorities following an air accident or incident, **nothing is to be moved from its post-crash position** (except where necessary to aid a victim) **or released** until the Procurator Fiscal Depute in charge of the scene, or in their absence, the Senior Investigating Officer authorises its removal. The police AAIA should be asked to provide advice regarding the removal of anything items of luggage or from the scene.

14.9 In the case of an aircraft from abroad, the UK Border Force must be informed and involved in the decision process regarding property from the aircraft. The EPA will assist the PIO in arranging translation services for any persons who do not speak English as a first language.

14.10 The remains of the aircraft will very likely be required for expert examination to establish the cause of the accident or to investigate the possibility of a crime.
It must therefore be treated as a crime scene and a 'sterile' area must be preserved as much as is possible, given there may be fire damage.

14.11 Only the following persons should be allowed access to the scene and aircraft remains at the appropriate stages of the incident, subject to the approval of the police officer in charge at the scene:

- Relevant emergency services’ and other medical personnel
- Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service representatives
- Department for Transport Inspectors of Accidents (AAIB)
- H.M. Customs and Excise officers
- Technical representatives of aircraft operators or manufacturers, properly authorised by the Inspector of Accidents in charge
- Repair and salvage parties properly authorised by the Inspector of Accidents

14.12 Consideration of access to the scene(s) can be given to other interested parties who may assist in the investigation, or the recovery of the aircraft or restoration of the scene to new normality. The Crime Scene Manager or the senior officer in charge of the scene will authorise scene access.

15. Military (Service) Aircraft

15.1 In the case of military aircraft in the service of any nation’s armed forces (also known as service aircraft) Police Scotland have primacy in dealing with the crash scene. Depending on the remoteness of the location of the scene, the RAF Mountain Rescue Team (RAF MRT) may be first to arrive. They are trained in all aspects of military Aircraft Post Scene Management (APCM).

15.2 The PIO and AAIA will liaise regarding how the cordon of such a scene is established and run, but the RAF MRT may assist in securing the outer cordon. The RAF MRT can also provide crucial advice on hazards within the cordon and are a valuable asset for the PIO.

15.3 It should be noted that the RAF MRT may take several hours to attend a crash scene in Scotland and once positioned in a cordon, RAF MRT members have no authority to require the public to remain outside that cordon. The Police Scotland MRT where appropriate, or police officers where the scene is not in a remote and/or mountainous environment will augment the RAF MRT personnel in a cordon.

15.4 There is no reason for any other military personnel to be within the cordon area until approval has been given by the senior police officer in charge at the scene and the military Post Crash Management Incident Officer (PCMIO) who
will deploy from either RAF Lossiemouth in the north of Scotland, or RAF Boulmer in the north east of England.

15.5 The RAFRLO can provide the PIO with guidance on any other military personnel who may legitimately request access to the accident site.

16. **Preservation of Scene for Service Aircraft**

16.1 Deceased victims and any parts of wreckage, no matter how widely scattered, will not be interfered with in any way unless it is essential to do so. If it is possible to photograph the wreckage or any deceased victim before they are moved, this should be done.

16.2 No clothing or equipment will be removed from deceased victims except by Service Medical Officers, unless this is necessary for the removal of such a victim from wreckage.

17. **Ongoing Security of Service Aircraft**

17.1 A crashed service aircraft will be guarded by the police until relieved by the RAF MRT and/or the Military Unit assigned to provide post-crash management.

17.2 This process will be initiated by the military without any specific request being made by the police, but it is for the police officer in charge of the enquiry to authorise such a hand over of duties.

18. **Air Accident or Incident Scene Hazards**

18.1 As has been mentioned, aircraft pose significant potential dangers to people, whether they have been in an accident or not. Whilst around an intact aircraft, great care must be taken as to how close an individual walks to the aircraft. Helicopters main rotor blades and tail rotors are particularly dangerous as are the areas around all propellers and jet engines.

18.2 For both fixed wing (planes) and rotor wing aircraft (helicopters, gyrocopter), officers should never approach an apparently serviceable aircraft before being briefed by the air crew or competent ground crew.

18.3 If an aircraft has been involved in an accident or incident, officers should get the advice of an AAIA prior to getting close to the aircraft.
18.4 There are many hazards at the site of an air accident or incident and not all will be immediately apparent. These hazards exist to both people and the environment and whilst we concentrate on the threat to people in this document, any environmental threat should be reported at an early stage to the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) and their advice sought. The AAIA and the EPA will advise on SEPA involvement.

18.5 Fire, Man-Made Mineral Fibres (MMMF’s), asbestos fibres, fuel, vapours, explosives, metal fragments, stored energy devices (batteries, gas cylinders, hydraulic systems etc.) and radioactive material may all be present, or a combination of some may be present at the site. Even if just one of the hazards is potentially present, the advice of an AAIA should be sought before approaching the aircraft.

18.6 The safest way of approaching such a scene is for the attending officers to stop a safe distance from the downed aircraft, as discussed at Section 13 – Cordons and contact an AAIA via Airwave. The AAIA will provide information regarding what health and safety precautions should be taken to assist personnel at or near the incident.

18.7 The standard advice is never get close to an aircraft which has crashed without full Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) (e.g. robust footwear, Tyvek suits, doubled up rubber gloves taped at the cuffs, FFP3 standard face masks and eye protection) appropriate to the extent of damage to the aircraft. However, it is acknowledged through experience that officers assess the location and situation for themselves and individual officers may feel that it is necessary to risk their own safety in order to establish if life can be saved.

18.8 The AAIA will provide advice for both Civil and Military aircraft.
18.9 Fire

18.9.1 It must be assumed that any fire will involve toxic materials in addition to the obvious risk from heat and burning. The level of risk attached to other hazards discussed hereafter can increase following a fire, as fire changes the properties of hazards, often making them more dangerous.

18.10 Man Made Mineral Fibres (MMMF)

18.10.1 Modern aircraft design involves the use of many man-made mineral fibres that in certain conditions pose a significant health hazard (combustible and carcinogenic). Aircraft crash sites should not be approached except under the advice of an AAIA, but if an officer makes a dynamic risk assessment that, in order to save life, they must be aware that they run the risk of breathing in MMMF’s. Without using an appropriate quality of respirator – (FFP3), MMMF which are breathed in can cause long term health issues.

18.10.2 The threat from MMMF’s is worse the more the components break up or following a fire.

18.10.3 The PIO should be alert to the possibility of cross contamination of MMMF from other emergency service personnel or contaminated casualties.

18.10.4 Decontamination is the responsibility of the Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS). SAS may request assistance from the SFRS should a large number of persons require decontamination.

18.11 Fuel

18.11.1 In the event of an aircraft accident or incident, a large quantity of fuel may be released between the point where the fuel system loses structural integrity, to the final resting point of the aircraft and possibly widespread in that area and in water courses. In warmer weather, fuel vapour will be generated more rapidly and ignite more readily.

18.11.2 Fuel and fuel vapour may drift downhill and travel downwind. Fuel vapour is heavier than air and can form an explosive atmosphere in confined spaces.

18.11.3 Doors and windows of buildings affected by fuel spillage or fuel vapour should be opened and any sources of potential ignition turned off. The safe evacuation of premises will be facilitated if required.

18.11.4 If the evacuation of premises is required, an Emergency Procedures Advisor (EPA) should be contacted via the police control room. An EPA is the police contact for multi-agency partners and will support the PIO in establishing properly considered rest centres amongst many other things.
18.11.5 If there is a smell of fuel vapour, do not use your Airwave radio (see 13.7 for safe Airwave distances). Move to a location that is up wind from where you smell the fuel and ensure it is safe to pass a message to the control room informing them as best you can of the location of the smell of fuel. The AAIA will ensure that the appropriate advice is passed to responders in order to mitigate risks with regards to fuel or fuel vapours.

18.11.6 With regards to missing aircraft in remote locations and poor visibility a smell of fuel can indicate a general location for the aircraft. Keep in mind such a smell may also be attributable to the presence of SAR aircraft.

18.12 Jet Engines

18.12.1 Jet engines are fitted to a large number of aircraft, including helicopters. Responders need to be aware that some aeroplanes have jet engines with propellers attached and so the presence of propellers does not mean that the aircraft has no jet engine, as is a common misconception.

18.12.2 Depending on the angle you approach a jet engine, it may not sound as though it is operating, and so great caution must be exercised if you ever have to approach an aircraft with jet engines running.

18.12.3 At an accident or incident, you must not get closer than 20 metres away from the front of a jet engine which is operating – you may get sucked into the engine which can result in death.

18.12.4 You must not get closer than 100 metres away from the rear of a jet engine which is operating – you will suffer the effect of ‘jet blast’, which means you will be severely burned by the extremely hot air and you will likely be blown off your feet by the force of the rapidly moving hot air. As a result of either, you may suffer severe injury or be killed.

18.13 Ejection Seats

18.13.1 Ejection seats are fitted to some military aeroplanes. Sometimes private buyers purchase military aeroplanes when they end their service with the military. The end result is that military and some privately owned aeroplanes have occupant ejection systems present in their aircraft.

18.13.2 Before an ejection seat and its occupant can leave the aircraft, the window over the cockpit, referred to as the canopy, is forced open, or off of the aircraft prior to the occupant(s) being ejected.

18.13.3 This removal of the canopy can be achieved in one of two ways.

18.13.4 Firstly, canopy’s can be fitted with explosive cord which, when detonated will destroy the canopy sending chards of various sized Perspex, at potentially high velocity, away from the aircraft.
18.13.5 Secondly, a canopy can have rocket motors fitted which will eject the entire canopy prior to the main seat ejection. Both methods can present fatal hazards to personnel in the vicinity.

18.13.6 Ejection seats are fired from the aircraft by explosive charges, and in some cases complementary rocket motors, thereby projecting the seat and occupant at great speed from the aircraft. The occupant should then descend under a parachute, however, the seat (which can weigh over 90 kilograms) will fall under gravity and may present a hazard to people and/or property on the ground.

18.13.7 On a case by case basis, not all the explosives will activate on the seat or canopy. This may be because there was no requirement for an individual explosive to fire, or there may have been a fault.

18.13.8 There are two important things to remember with regards to ejection systems;
   • If activated, the ejection seat or seats and the canopy may be some distance from the main wreckage of an aeroplane and must be found as a matter of urgency, the advice of an AAIA must be sought on this point.
   • Whether separated from a crashed aircraft or not, the canopy and ejection seats are to be treated as extremely dangerous. **Canopies and Ejection Seats must not be interfered with by any emergency responder. Only RAF MRT or specialist RAF personnel are trained to approach assess and / or handle ejection seats and canopies. No emergency responders are currently trained to handle these objects, so do not accept that they are if you are told so.**

18.13.9 A **100 metre** cordon must be placed around both the canopy and any ejection seat which is found, that includes an ejection seat which still has an occupant in it.

18.13.10 **Accidental activation of the ejection sequence can cause fatal injuries to responders and seat occupants.**

18.13.11 Crash helmets are not to be removed by anyone other than a medically qualified person unless it is necessary to preserve life.

18.13.12 Aircraft fitted with ejection seats may be identified by the following markings: a red equilateral triangle having 9” sides and apex pointing downwards situated on each side of the fuselage. The word “DANGER” on each side of the triangle and the words “EJECTION SEAT” are normally inscribed in the triangle.
18.14 Ballistic Recovery System (BRS)

18.14.1 Crashed light civil aircraft may be equipped with a BRS. This is sometimes known as a ballistic parachute. The device incorporates a parachute which is deployed by a rocket. The BRS can be activated by the pilot during flight to bring a damaged or out of control aircraft safely to the ground. However, an un-deployed BRS on a crashed aircraft is a significant hazard to responders. Even once deployed, the parachute of the deployed BRS becomes a significant hazard once the aircraft lands.

18.14.2 The force AAIA will advise you regarding conduct around an aircraft fitted with a BRS.

18.15 Aircraft Tyres

18.15.1 Some aircraft tyres can be pressurised to 250 psi and can deflate explosively if damaged by fire or impact. You must be careful around detached aircraft wheels and do not interfere with them in any way.
18.16 Radiation Hazards (Non-Nuclear)

18.16.1 The police will maintain a safety distance of at least 2 metres from any wreckage because of the possible radiation hazard from damaged equipment, which may contain radioactive material. Where there has been a fire, the hazards from breathing in radioactive material are increased significantly.

18.16.2 It has been mentioned many times, but the importance of placing an appropriate sized cordon round the air accident scene, and for emergency responders to remain outside the cordon and remain upwind and uphill if possible cannot be overstated.

18.17 Weapon Systems

18.17.1 Military aircraft may be fitted with various explosive devices and occasionally carry high explosive bombs and other weapons on training flights. In accident conditions and particularly if subjected to fire, there is an increased risk of explosion. No attempt should therefore be made to move or interfere with them otherwise than by qualified armament personnel.

18.17.2 The force AAIA will provide safety advice regarding armed military aircraft, but it may take some time to confirm if an aircraft is armed, therefor there will be an assumption that any military fast jet which crashes is armed and **there will be a complete evacuation of persons to 400 metres**, with a further evacuation of people who do not have hard cover out to **800 metres**.

18.18 Airbags

18.18.1 Some seatbelts in small aircraft contain occupant airbags. The seatbelts containing airbags are usually broad and thicker than normal car type seatbelts. They are connected to a pressurised container which delivers air to the airbag in the event of an accident. Great care must be taken if entering a small aircraft not to disrupt airbag seatbelts which may not have activated. They should be treated as stored energy devices and advice from an AAIA must be sought before entering the aircraft.

19. Media Interest

19.1 There is significant media interest in any air accident and as the size of the aircraft increases, the number of potential casualties increases or if the aircraft is a military or display aircraft, the media interest increases as well.

19.2 From the outset of an air accident, Police Scotland's Media team should be made aware at the earliest possible opportunity. Social media means that air accidents are normally widely reported on various web sites and in turn on major news providers at a very early stage. With this in mind, Police Scotland's media team require the earliest practicable notification of such an incident.
19.3 The EPA will assist the PIO to keep Police Scotland media staff up to date and will help arrange a suitable Forward Media Point at the scene, located near to, but outside the outer cordon.

19.4 Media representatives and the public should not be prevented from taking images of a crashed civil aircraft from outside the outer cordon. Details of persons taking the images should be recorded so that image copies may be obtained later if necessary to assist in the subsequent inquiry.

19.5 At the scene of a crash involving a military aircraft, certain features of such aircraft and the equipment they carry may be classified and any unauthorised disclosure of this information could be against national or public interest.

19.6 Press photographers and television and film cameramen wishing to photograph or film wreckage should, therefore, be invited, in the interests of security, to refrain from doing so until the appropriate Service personnel have examined the scene of the accident and covered or removed classified material. If, however, they are not prepared to comply with such a request, they should be permitted to take photographs or films. Before they begin to take images of the scene, their names, addresses and telephone numbers should be noted, together with details of the newspaper, agency or television or film company that they represent. The accuracy of the identity of people claiming to be from the press should be verified before they leave the scene.

19.7 Information relating to press staff who take images should be given to the Military PCMIO on arrival who will, if necessary, report to the Ministry of Defence.

19.8 If a person does not identify himself to the satisfaction of a police officer, or does not appear to be who they claimed to be should not be treated as a genuine press or broadcasting representative but should be dealt with under the terms of the following paragraph.

19.9 Persons other than authorised representatives of the news media wishing to take images of the accident scene or anything contained within it should be warned that the scene of an air accident involving a service aircraft may be a "prohibited place" within the meaning of the Official Secrets Act 1911 and, accordingly that images may be taken only with the prior approval of the senior officer of the Military Service Team.

19.10 In the case of a foreign military aircraft, e.g. an United States Air Force aircraft, the provisions relating to “prohibited places” do not apply and any warning regarding recording images should be that the possibility that obtaining or communicating to any other person images or information about the crashed aircraft may contravene Section 1(1)(c) of the Official Secrets Act 1911. If films or photographs are taken before such approval is given, the person may be arrested and their image capturing device may have to be handed over to the police. The names and addresses should be taken of any such persons who take photographs and those who fail to identify themselves.
to the satisfaction of the police should have their cameras and any data collection device or film seized.

19.11 An air accident scene is a crime scene like any other and members of the public, including all members of the press must not be allowed within the outer cordon at any air accident or incident scene under any circumstances. To allow entry will compromise public and emergency responders’ safety.

20. **Officer and Staff Welfare**

20.1 Air accidents or incidents can be very challenging to respond to and the scene(s) potentially difficult, dangerous and harrowing places to operate as an emergency responder. Apart from the physical and environmental hazards, there are often high levels of destruction to both the aircraft and ground objects and also extreme disruption of human remains.

20.2 The welfare of all Police Scotland staff and officers involved in the incident must be considered at all times.

20.3 Whilst there is a lawful duty to carry out the necessary police activities at such scenes, the challenging circumstances should be dynamically risk assessed and managed with the wellbeing of emergency responders in mind at all times. Ensuring officers and staff are clothed in appropriate PPE and clothing for the weather conditions at the earliest practicable opportunity is of paramount importance. The provision of appropriate hot and cold food and fluids, toilets and wash areas are vital and adequate breaks and physical and mental health support at the scene(s) must be considered given the task which must be carried out. This ideally means the provision of a quiet area, away from the scene, to allow workers from the scene time away to rest or reflect.

20.4 Representatives from Health and Wellbeing staff, religious and/or faith representatives, the Scottish Police Federation, UNISON and any other department or organisation who can provide Police officers and staff with support should be considered for notification at an early stage.

20.5 Post incident care of all Police staff and officers involved must also be considered. At the appropriate point following an incident, the senior investigating officer should appoint an individual to manage the Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) process and all efforts should be made to ensure all Police Scotland personnel involved in the incident are offered appropriate support. For additional information, refer to the Firearms – Post Deployment Procedures SOP and the Trauma Risk Management SOP.
21. **Investigation of Air Accidents**

21.1 When rescue and lifesaving duties are completed, the police, Procurator Fiscal (where fatalities are involved) and AAIB will work in parallel on three general areas of investigation:

- Identification of the deceased victims, establishment of cause of death and notification to next of kin
- Survivor, witness and any other relevant evidence
- Investigation of the cause of the accident

21.2 For a military aircraft accident, the MOD will nominate a Service Inquiry Panel (SIP) that will, working alongside the, DAIB, conduct a role similar to the AAIB.

21.3 The police co-ordination role in the investigation will ensure the many agencies involved, which will bring similar areas of expertise, work effectively together and in consultation with each other, to ensure roles and responsibilities are agreed and utilised effectively. It should be noted that the AAIB, the SIP and the DAIB’s roles are to investigate accidents for the purpose of improving aviation safety, not to apportion blame.

21.4 The Procurator Fiscal’s authority in the investigation will take precedence, therefor Police Scotland, as agents of Crown Office, have primacy in the investigation until the police investigation team and Procurator Fiscal dealing with the incident are satisfied that no further police involvement is required.

22. **Notification to Next of Kin**

22.1 Police Scotland will co-ordinate the informing of next of kin where life has been lost in an aircraft accident. Informing relatives is a primary task following an air accident.

22.2 The way in which this will be done will be entirely dependent on the circumstances and an effective strategy for carrying out this task will be established by the senior police officer.

22.3 Notification to the next of kin of deceased victims in a military aircraft may be carried out by the nearest Service unit. This applies to all passengers, whether military or civilian, but does not apply to deceased victims who were not passengers, but on the ground. Should the aircraft be a civil one on charter to one of the Services, the same rules apply.

22.4 Where foreign nationals are concerned definitive police information will be passed through the appropriate consulate or embassy regardless of any independent arrangements made by the airline or their agents.
23. **Sporting and Recreational Aircraft**

23.1 As a general rule there will not be a formal AAIB investigation into an accident involving a glider or hang glider, unless the circumstances are in some way remarkable.

23.2 Similarly, only fatal accidents involving microlight aircraft and hot air balloons are normally investigated by the AAIB. These aircraft are considered to be used as a sporting activity and the relevant Associations have been delegated responsibility by the CAA to investigate fatal or serious accidents involving such aircraft.

23.3 Should such an accident occur, the same processes as described in previous paragraphs will be followed by Police Scotland. The AAIA will notify the AAIB’s duty Inspector. The AAIB Inspector will decide on the course of action with regards to who will be the appointed investigation body from the AAIB side. Whether the independent investigator is from the AAIB or the relevant Association, assistance will be provided by Police Scotland officers and staff.

23.4 As with conventional aircraft, the preservation of all evidence is vital and the scene and wreckage must not be disturbed unless absolutely necessary to save life. Scene advice will be provided to first responders by an AAIA.

24. **Unauthorised Landings**

24.1 If an aircraft lands other than at a licensed aerodrome, officers should consider detaining the aircraft pending further enquiry.

24.2 Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides the opportunity for authorised officers to stop, detain and search aircraft, passengers or crew, to establish if the subjects are involved in the Commission, Preparation or Instigation of an act of terrorism. This power is in addition to any additional statute, Common Law or By-Law, which may be appropriate to the circumstances.

24.3 Full details of the aircraft route, aircraft type and registration number along with passengers and crew details should be obtained.

24.4 Advice relating to legislation and flight movements (International, Domestic or Common Travel Area (CTA)) can be obtained from the on call Border Policing Command Duty Inspector (Via Service Overview) or the 24/7 Fixed Intelligence Management Unit (FIMU) based at Gartcosh again contactable through a police control room.

24.5 **Aircraft or Passenger Details**

24.5.1 Border Policing Command Intelligence Units based at Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen Airports hold contact details to assist with direct access to Airline Operators and Ground Handling Agents.
24.5.2 If out with office hours, 24/7 assistance can be sought via the on call Border Policing Command Inspector who may be contacted through a police control room.

25. **UK Border Force**

25.1 UK Border Force is the law enforcement command within the Home Office.

25.2 Border Force secures the UK border by carrying out immigration and custom controls for people and goods entering the UK.

25.3 Project ‘Pegasus’ is a joint initiative by the National Crime Agency, Police Scotland and UK Border Force, to address terrorist and criminal threats to the aviation community.

25.4 There is no recipe for terrorist, criminal, or suspicious activity. If it seems odd, report it, the smallest thing can be significant.

25.5 Should officers locate a subject of interest, 24/7 Immigration checks can be made via the UK Border Command and Control Intelligence Unit on 0161 261 1640. Alternatively contact can be made with UKBF located at Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen Airports.

25.6 Intelligence should be submitted to the SID including the header ‘Pegasus’ or ‘Lightning’. Consideration should also be given to contacting local Divisional Intelligence Units or the 24/7 National Intelligence Branch (NIB) Unit, contactable through a police control room.

26. **Helicopters**

26.1 **Landing Site for use in Emergency Role**

26.1.1 On occasion it may be necessary for Police, Ambulance, MCA SAR or even military helicopters to land at or near to a locus in order to carry out a vital function such as transport patients or deliver some vital staff or resources.

26.1.2 Emergency service personnel must be made aware of the dangers of working with helicopters. Considerations for ground personnel include, but are not limited to:

- Rotor down wash and associated flying debris
- Main and tail rotor blades
- Hot exhausts and jet efflux
- Noise
- Effects of sloping ground
- Wind Direction
26.1.3 Once landed, ground staff must never approach the helicopter under any circumstances, unless provided with a safety brief by a helicopter crew member and being specifically invited to approach the helicopter with the pilots consent. This is true whether the helicopter appears to be operative or not.

26.1.4 Take great care if the ground on which the helicopter has landed is not completely level as the rotor blades may be rotating very close to the ground with the obvious danger of critical injuries or more likely death if contact with rotating rotor blades is made.

26.1.5 You may not be able to see helicopter blades or tail rotor blades if they are rotating.

26.1.6 When such a scene landing has to be made, the location the helicopter touches down must be carefully considered and officers on the ground may have to provide assistance to the commander of the helicopter with regards to suggesting a landing site, possibly a back-up landing site and then securing the chosen site.

26.1.7 Whilst the safety of a helicopter and its passengers and any decision to land remains the responsibility of the pilot in command, remember the Police have overall responsibility for scene management at all land based incidents. Public safety on the ground must be a police priority at all times.

26.2 Off-Road Landing

26.2.1 It will usually be best if a site off of a road can be chosen for a helicopter landing. There are various reasons for this such as the amount of space available for the aircraft. There are a few things that officers on the ground should check before recommending an off road site for landing. These include;

- A clear area approximately 50 metres by 50 metres (about half the size of a football pitch) is best, close by the locus of the incident
- The area should be free from obstructions such as bushes or loose debris
- The ground should be firm and reasonably level
- There must be no overhead wires at all within the area and any overhead wires on the periphery of the landing area must be notified to the air crew. This is particularly important during times of reduced visibility or darkness
- Ground staff and air crew should be confident that there is nothing underground at the landing site which may make it dangerous, such a underground gas pipes or abandoned mine access, the land owner may be able to advise in this regard
- The landing area must be secured and every effort made to prevent access by any person or animal
- If a fence surrounds the landing site, access over or through the fence should be available to the air crew
26.3 On-Road Landing

26.3.1 Helicopters should not land on a road unless the following requirements can be complied with:

- Where a landing is made on a road it must be secured by the Police prior to landing
- Prior to landing on the road, radio or verbal communication should have taken place with the Police (via the other emergency services, Rescue Co-ordination Centres (RCC) or Air Traffic Control (ATC), where necessary) to confirm the road is secure and the pilot has authority to exercise his discretion to land
- Minimum amount of time shall be spent on the road by the helicopter sufficient to fulfil its emergency function
- Officers should make every effort to ensure there are no obvious weak points on the road in the area in which the helicopter will land, e.g. drains, large pot holes etc.

26.3.2 On a motorway, dual carriageway or two-way road, when the helicopter is landing and taking off, the unaffected carriageway or lane must be closed at all times. Sufficient distance between the helicopter and the public must be maintained at all times. The pilot will be able to supply information about safe distances via the police control room and the appropriate ATC, or in some cases the police control room may be able to establish an Airwave talk group for officers at the scene to talk directly to the air crew.

26.3.3 Officers must not approach the helicopter unless provided with a safety brief by a helicopter crew member and being specifically invited to approach the helicopter with the pilots consent. This is true whether the helicopter appears to be operative or not.

26.4 Lighting for Night Helicopter Landings

26.4.1 It is likely that any helicopter landing during reduced visibility or hours of darkness will land whilst the crew are using night vision equipment.

26.4.2 The crew may request land based officers at the landing site illuminate the site in some way when the helicopter is approaching from some distance, but once the crew have established where they are going to consider landing, all lighting at the site must be extinguished. Ground lighting will blind any air crew using night vision equipment and ground officers must keep this in mind and make sure not to use lighting until the helicopter is safely landed and the crew have indicated that they are no longer wearing night vision equipment.
26.5 Emergency Services Helicopter De-Confliction

26.5.1 The Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) is the controlling authority for all SAR helicopters operating in Great Britain. When ARCC staff have tasked a SAR or Military helicopter to an incident that might also be attended by a Police Air Support Unit (ASU) or an Air Ambulance asset, the ARCC should contact the appropriate Control/Communications Room and pass on the following information:

a) Which SAR aircraft will be attending an incident
b) The incident location
c) The helicopter call sign
d) The helicopters anticipated arrival direction and ETA on scene
e) Contact frequency and
f) Request that this information is immediately made available to any ASU or Air Ambulance that may be operating in the same area.

27. Emergency Flying Restrictions – Event Planning / Incident Locus Protection

27.1 Emergency Controlling Authority (ECA)

27.1.1 When any incident occurs, it is widely recognised that the police force for the area in which an incident is occurring has been shown to be best placed to assess the overall situation and to appreciate what wider effects an incident may have. For that reason, police in the UK have been allowed the status of Emergency Controlling Authority (ECA) enabling them to directly request and subsequently monitor, manage and in some cases enforce flying restrictions.

27.1.2 It has therefore been agreed nationally that in the case of emergency response incidents or policing of events overseen by the police, the appropriate Chief Constable, or his Depute at the time, should be designated as Emergency Controlling Authority (ECA).

27.1.3 Police Scotland are therefore an ECA and when an incident occurs, Police Scotland is trusted to use this overarching appreciation of incidents and is granted the authority to directly request and subsequently monitor, manage and in some cases enforce flying restrictions. CAALO’s carry out this role on behalf of the force.

27.2 Imposition of Flying Restrictions

27.2.1 Flying restrictions are restrictions on the movement of aircraft within a designated area of airspace that are only requested where there is no other legal option or physical mitigation to put in place to ensure the best interests of the public.
27.2.2 On receipt of a request from an Event, Operation or Incident Commander, the Police Scotland CAALO will act as gatekeeper and will liaise with the incident commander to advise on how airspace restrictions may relate to the specific event, operation or incident in question.

27.2.3 The CAALO may apply for the most appropriate method of making the airspace safe in a given location for a given set of circumstances. Depending on the type of airspace restriction requested, the CAA will challenge the CAALO on the reasons for the request and ensure all other legal options or mitigations have been considered and discounted as inadequate to achieve the lawful objective.

27.2.4 Following consultation between the CAALO and the CAA, the CAA will approach the DfT for a restriction of flying regulations to be made. Before making a regulation the DfT will need to be satisfied that it is justified in the public interest and to do this they may consult with the Police Scotland CAALO directly. The DfT also reserves the right to consult the Scottish Office if advice is needed about the actions of any ECA.

27.2.5 There are two options open to the CAALO when considering the public interest with regards to public and airspace safety.

27.3 Temporary Danger Area (TDA)

27.3.1 The law relating to Temporary Danger Areas (TDA) and the statutory restriction of flying is governed by the Air Navigation Order 2016. The establishment of a TDA should discourage aircraft crews not directly concerned with the incident from flying in the immediate vicinity. A TDA has the advantage of being very readily applied, but does not provide powers to prevent flying through the TDA by civil aircraft.

27.3.2 If a TDA fails to achieve the objective of inhibiting unnecessary flying, then statutory ‘Restriction of Flying Regulations’ may require to be brought into force, but it is stressed that these regulations can be justified only on the grounds of public interest (which can include the interest of preserving safety on the ground and in the air) or national security or defence.

27.3.4 Because of the legal process involved in the making of the Statutory Instrument for a RA(T), there will inevitably be some delay before the TDA can be changed to a Restricted Area (Temporary) (RA(T)).

27.4 Restricted Area (Temporary) (RA(T))

27.4.1 In the majority of cases, a TDA may be considered and even tried, but a TDA may not suffice as there is no enforcement capability. Recent experience has shown that a RA(T) is the most effective way of optimising aviators compliance with a requirement not to enter a volume of airspace deemed necessary to restrict in the public interest.
27.4.2 For any planned event or operation, or in response to any incident or accident or any other situation where Police Scotland senior management consider there to be any form of threat to the public safety or security in the air, a Police Scotland CAALO will provide advice regarding a possible restriction of airspace.

27.4.3 The CAALO will liaise with the senior police officer involved in planning the event, operation, or in the response to an incident and if there is a strong public interest case, the CAALO will seek to obtain the appropriate level of restriction for airspace.

27.4.4 Where the planning team for an event or operation decide that a RA(T) is a justifiable requirement, the planning team should contact the CAALO 100 days prior to the date the RA(T) is required to begin. This is because the CAA and DfT processes take that length of time to complete. It is possible to obtain a RA(T) with less notice than 100 days, but the shorter notification will have to be justified to the CAA and DfT.

27.4.5 If the request for a RA(T) is in order to respond to an emergency incident, there is good justification for shortcutting the usual process and it can be put in place much more rapidly. Depending on the time and day of the request a RA(T) can be established within a couple of hours.

27.4.6 In every case where a RA(T) is being considered, the CAALO will provide advice to the senior officer involved, but restrictions on flying are likely to be necessary only where there is an exceptionally strong public interest case. For example, where there is a serious and immediate danger to life and/or property, e.g. a siege or other major criminal incident involving firearms or explosives, a major disturbance at a penal establishment or a civil emergency where unauthorised over-flying is likely to be dangerous to aircraft or hamper rescue work. It is the responsibility on the CAALO to ensure Police Scotland managers are provided the correct advice, to enable them to be fully satisfied that justification to a high enough standard exists to make the application.

27.4.7 If a RA(T) is granted, the responsibility to manage the airspace on behalf of Police Scotland will always fall to a CAALO. The CAALO will be named on the Statutory Instrument creating the restriction and a contact telephone number for the CAALO placed on aviation websites on the internet. The purpose of this is so aviators can contact the CAALO directly to request permission to enter the restricted airspace and to put forward a public interest case as to why they should be granted access. It is for the CAALO to consider the request and consult with the senior officer involved in the event, operation or incident as to what requests to fly in the restricted area are being made.

27.4.8 Where any restriction has been placed on flying, the CAALO will always look to end the restriction at the earliest possible safe opportunity, whether an end time and date was provided by the CAA or not.
28. **Flight within the Restricted Area**

28.1 If Police Scotland are successful in being granted a RA(T), the role of Police Scotland CAALO will be named on the Statutory Instrument (SI) detailing the restriction as the only authority who may grant permission for aircraft to be flown within the designated area.

28.2 Before considering a request, the CAALO will need to obtain information on the operator and pilot of the aircraft and the 'public interest' case being put forward by the person requesting the flight. Depending on the nature of the reason for the restriction, it may be necessary on public safety grounds, for the CAALO to obtain details of who will be on board an aircraft and what hazards may be aboard before considering any request.

28.3 Any permission for over flight granted by the CAALO may stipulate some or all of the following conditions;

- Time flight within the area is permitted from and to
- A designated area to operate an unmanned aircraft from and to
- Type of aircraft to be operated within the restricted area at any given time
- Primacy of aircraft within the restricted area at any given time
- An area in which the aircraft may be flown within the restricted area
- Conditions in relation to sharing the restricted area with other aircraft
- Conditions in relation to the standard of risk assessments submitted by a pilot to the responsible CAALO, for a flight within the restricted area
- Details of the person or organisation responsible for operating the aircraft
- Details of a specific aircraft being allowed to fly

28.4 The above list is an example and is not exhaustive. Any requests for information will be necessary to ensure public safety.

28.5 Every effort will be made by the CAALO to provide the pilot with printed information of conditions applicable to any permission to enter the restricted airspace.
Appendix ‘A’

List of Associated Legislation

- The Air Navigation Order 2016
- Official Secrets Act 1911
- Terrorism Act 2000
Appendix ‘B’

List of Associated Reference Documents

Policy

- Specialist Operations Policy

Standard Operating Procedures

- Policing of Airports SOP
- Air Support Unit SOP
- Major Incidents – Initial Response, Roles and Structures SOP
- Firearms – Post Deployment Procedures SOP
- Trauma Risk Management SOP

Risk Assessments

- M-001 Major Incidents Generic Risk Assessment
- M-007 Military and Civilian Aircraft Incidents Generic Risk Assessment
- D-002 Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) Generic Risk Assessment
List of Associated Forms

- Trauma Risk Management (TRiM) Record
## Glossary of Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAIA</td>
<td>Air Accident and Incident Advisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAIB</td>
<td>Air Accidents Investigation Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>Aeronautical Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIS(M)</td>
<td>Aeronautical Information Service (Military)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APCM</td>
<td>Aircraft Post Crash Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCC</td>
<td>Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARO</td>
<td>Aircraft Recovery Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASU</td>
<td>Air Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATC</td>
<td>Air Traffic Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRS</td>
<td>Ballistic Recovery Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAA</td>
<td>Civil Aviation Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAALO</td>
<td>Civil Aviation Authority Liaison Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPFS</td>
<td>Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSM</td>
<td>Crime Scene Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTA</td>
<td>Common Travel Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAIB</td>
<td>Defence Accident Investigation Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCDSDO</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Defence Staff Duty Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIT</td>
<td>Department for Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>Detective Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVI</td>
<td>Disaster Victim Identification</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Emergency Controlling Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EPA</td>
<td>Emergency Procedures Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPIC</td>
<td>Emergency Procedures Information Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETA</td>
<td>Expected Time of Arrival</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCP</td>
<td>Forward Control Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIC</td>
<td>Fire Incident Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIMU</td>
<td>Fixed Intelligence Management Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMT</td>
<td>Greenwich Mean Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>JARTS</td>
<td>Joint Aircraft Recovery and Transportation Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Maritime and Coastguard Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>Major Investigation Team</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
OFFICIAL

MMMF  Man-Made Mineral Fibres
MOD   Ministry of Defence
MOD IO Ministry of Defence Incident Officer
MRT   Mountain Rescue team
MST   Military Service Team
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NATS  National Air Traffic Services
NILO  National Inter-agency Liaison Officer
NMOC  National Maritime Operations Centre
OCIC  Operations Control and Intelligence Centre
OSD   Operational Support Division
PCMIO Post-Crash Management Incident Officer
PIO   Police Incident Officer
PPE   Personal Protective Equipment
PSI   Pounds per Square Inch
RAF   Royal Air Force
RAFLO Royal Air Force Liaison Officer
RA(T) Restricted Area (Temporary)
RCAF  Royal Canadian Air Force
RVP   Rendezvous Point
SAR   Search and Rescue
SAS   Scottish Ambulance Service
SEPA  Scottish Environmental Protection Agency
SFRS  Scottish Fire and Rescue Service
SIP   Service Inquiry Panel
SIT   Service Inquiry Team
SOP   Standard Operating Procedure
SST   Special Safety Team
LATCC (Mil) London Air Traffic Control Centre (Military)
TDA   Temporary Danger Area
TRiM  Trauma Risk Management
UAS   Unmanned Aircraft System
USAF  United States Air Force

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